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ON A HITHERTO NEGLECTED TEXT 
AGAINST BUDDHIST PERSONALISM: 
Mahynastrlakra 18.92–103 and its Bhya 
Vincent Eltschinger, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia 
Austrian Academy of Sciences (Vienna) 
Aux anges, aux mânes  
et aux eaux de Kyto 
Abstract 1 
According to the Chinese pilgrims Xuanzang and Yijing, the Smitya sect of Buddhism, an 
offshoot of the Vtsputrya sect, had become by far the most important among the non-
Mahynist denominations of the northern half of India by the turn of the 7th century CE. Now, the 
Smityas were famous for professing a personalist doctrine (pudgalavda) that singled them out 
as “heretics” and triggered off vehement criticism on the part of their “coreligionists.” Whereas 
only a few Smitya works have survived down to us in Chinese translation, most of their 
opponents’ tracts have been preserved either in Sanskrit or in Tibetan translation, the most 
celebrated ones being those of Vasubandhu, Candrakrti and Kamalala. However, one of the 
earliest extant Yogcra sources, the Mahynastrlakra(bhya), dedicates a section of 
respectable length to the critique of Buddhist personalism. The present essay provides this 
neglected early testimony with an introduction, an annotated translation, and text-critical notes. 
1 The present study has been made possible by the generous financial support of the Austrian 
Science Fund (FWF-Projekt P19862 “Philosophische und religiöse Literatur des Buddhis-
mus”) and the Numata Foundation, which allowed me to spend three and a half months in 
Kyoto (Ryukoku University). Thanks are due to Prof. Shoryu Katsura who invited me in 
Kyoto and succeeded in making my stay there an unforgettable event; to Kazuo Kano, who 
generously put at my disposal his still provisional edition of Vairocanarakita’s Str-
lakraviv	ti; to Kensho Okada for sending me his excellent MA-thesis and two articles he 
wrote with Sayaka Kishi; to Chizuko Yoshimizu, who enabled me to meet these dis-
tinguished young scholars of Tsukuba University (and spend two rainy but happy days in 
Kobuchizawa); to Isabelle Ratié, who made very insightful remarks on this essay. 
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1. Buddhist Personalism and its Critique 
1.1. 
According to Bareau, the Vtsputrya sect branched off from the Sthavira group 
of early Buddhism some time during the first half of the 3rd century BCE.2 
Around the turn of the Common Era, the Vtsputrya movement gave rise to 
four sub-sects: the Bhadraynyas, the Dharmottaryas, the aagarikas (or: 
a	agirikas) and the Smityas (or: Smatyas).3 Except for the aaga-
rikas, these sub-sects are attested epigraphically from the 2nd century CE on: in 
Mathur and Srnth (Smityas, resp. 2nd and 4th century CE), in Karle and 
Junnar (Dharmottaryas, 2nd century CE), in Nsik and Kanheri (Bhadraynyas, 
2nd century CE).4 While the history and ideas of the first three sub-sects are 
shrouded in mystery, it seems very likely that the Smityas gained pro-
minence and eventually eclipsed even the mother-sect, the Vtsputryas.5 And if 
the testimony of the Chinese pilgrims Xuanzang and Yijing is to be trusted, by 
the 7th century CE, the Smityas had become by far the numerically most 
important group among the few surviving non-Mahynist denominations 
(Sarvstivdins, Sthaviras). Their area of influence extended from the lower 
Indus to the lower Ganges with nearly hegemonic strongholds in Sindh (about 
100 monasteries and 10'000 monks), Mlava (about 100 monasteries and 20'000 
monks) and, most importantly perhaps, Valabh, where a huge monastic complex 
(vihramaala) and intellectual centre flourished since the beginning of the 6th 
century under Maitraka patronage. 6  Interestingly enough, certain among the 
doctrines of this important Buddhist denomination have been held consistently 
by all other Buddhist groups to be a heresy – a deviation – known as 
“personalism” (pudgalavda).7 In other words, whatever the representativity of 
2 See Bareau 1955:33 and 114. 
3 For a legendary account of this schism, see Bareau 1955:122–123 and Lusthaus 2009:285. 
4 See Bareau 1955:36. For references, see Bareau 1955:122nn. 2–3, 127n. 4, 128n. 4. 
5 Note, in this connection, Yaomitra’s explanation of “vtsputrya” in AKVy 699,3: 
vtsputry ryasmaty. ryasmitya also occurs at MAV 268,7 (’phags pa ma 
pos bkur ba pa). 
6 See Bareau 1955:36 and 121–122. All in all, the Smitya sect amounted to about 65'000 
monks and 1'000 monasteries (16'000/500 for the Sarvstivdins, 20'000/200 for the 
Sthaviras). 
7 On this translation, see Chau 1984:7. Note that the expressions “Pudgalavdin/Pudgalavda” 
(in much the same way as “Hnayna”) refers neither to an institutional sect nor to a 
doctrinal school, but rather to the (alleged) representatives of a set of doctrines based on the 
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personalism within the Smitya monastic communities, the most powerful 
among the non-Mahynist denominations was deemed heretic by most of its 
coreligionists. 8  During centuries, from the Kathvatthu to Kamalala, the 
intellectual elite of all other groups and/or schools (Theravdins; Vaibhikas, 
Mdhyamikas, Yogcras, Sautrntika, “epistemologists,” etc.) shaped ever 
more sophisticated arguments against the Vtsputrya and/or Smitya 
pudgalavda. But what did these Buddhist personalists – apparently a contra-
diction in terms – teach?9 
1.2. 
While shaping their doctrine of the pudgala, the Buddhist personalists are likely 
to have attempted to solve several problems they felt were left open by the 
dominant interpretation of the Buddha’s Law in strict terms of selflessness and 
impermanence. These problems pertained to issues such as memory and 
knowledge, serial continuity, ethical responsability, eschatology, soteriology 
and, last but not least, salvation and the nature of the liberated saint. 
Interestingly enough, a good deal of these problems and their solutions clearly 
________________________________ 
notion of pudgala, and always through the lenses of their opponents. To the best of my 
knowledge, no Indian Buddhist thinker has ever used this rather deprecative label as a self-
designation. 
8 If the term is appropriate at all under such circumstances, for the Buddhists of all persua-
sions who thought of themselves as “orthodox” (i.e., non-Pudgalavdins) held contradictory 
opinions on the issue of whether the Pudgalavdins were Buddhists or not. “Coreligionists” 
(svaythya) appears in MSAVBh (see below, n. 53), MAV 244,8 (ra gi sde pa ma pos 
bkur pa; *svaythy smity) and 286,12, and “Buddhist” (bauddha) in MSAVBh (see 
below, n. 72) and AKVy 699,4–5 (na hi vtsputry moko neyate / bauddhatvt /). 
But to authors such as Vasubandhu, ntarakita, Kamalala and Prajñkaramati, the Pud-
galavdins are at best “pseudo-Buddhists” (saugatamanya) and “outsiders from within” 
(antacaratrthika). See AKBh 472,13–15: tasmd d	
yarbudam etasmin sana utpanna 
ya ea eke pudgalagrha eke sarvanstitgrha / ye 'pi ca dravyntaram evt-
mna manyante trthakrs tem eva mokbhvadoo nikampa /, TS 336: kecit tu 
saugatamany apy tmna pracakate / pudgalavyapadeena tattvnyatvdivarjitam //, 
and BCAP 328,28–329,1: pudgalavdinas tu punar antacaratrthik / skandhebhyas 
tattvnyatvbhym avcya pudgalanmnam tmnam icchati / anyath trthika-
siddhntbhiniveadarana syt / ha ca – kecic ca saugatamany apy tmna 
pracakata* iti /. *= TS 336. See also the other texts discussed in Koa V.228. 
9 On the doctrines of the Pudgalavdins, see Venkata Ramanan 1953, Bareau 1955:114–130, 
Chau 1984, Chau 1987, Lusthaus 2009. 
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foreshadow the later debates on tman/antman between Buddhist and non-
Buddhists intellectuals.10 
1.3. 
According to nearly all doxographic accounts, the Vtsputryas’ and 
Smityas’ main thesis was the following: “La personne (pudgala) est perçue 
(upalabhyate) comme une réalité évidente (sktk	taparamrthena). La 
personne n’est ni identique (sama) aux agrégats (skandha) ni différente (viama) 
d’eux. Elle n’existe ni dans les agrégats ni en dehors d’eux.”11 But did the 
Pudgalavdins really claim, as all their opponents would like them to do, that the 
pudgala ultimately exists (as °paramrthena would suggest), i.e., that it exists as 
a substantial (dravyasat), independent (< bhvntara) entity? According to most 
of the rare extant Vtsputrya/Smitya sources,12 the doctrine of the pudgala 
was meant to provide a satisfactory account of Buddhism as a middle way 
(madhyam pratipad) between the extremes of eternalism (vatavda) and 
annihilationism (ucchedavda). This seems at least to be the meaning of the 
personalists’ statement to the effect that the pudgala cannot be said (avaktavya) 
to be either the same as or distinct from the five aggregates. For if the pudgala is 
the same as the skandhas, it will be as conditioned (sask	ta) and hence 
momentary (kaika) as they are, and one can no longer account for recollection, 
continuity and moral responsibility. But if the pudgala is independent from the 
skandhas, it will be as eternal and unconditioned as the non-Buddhists’ tman, 
and then any relationship with psycho-physical reality and need for religious life 
(brahmacarya) will be lost.13 By claiming that their pudgala was neither an 
eternal and independent entity nor an impermanent entity reducible to the 
psycho-physical constituents, the Pudgalavdins expected not only to provide 
the middle way with a doctrinal foundation, but also to disclose the rationale 
10 In this regard, the S provides a fascinating example of a still purely intra-Buddhistic 
controversy on exegetical and philosophical issues. 
11 Bareau 1955:115 (Vtsputrya), to be compared with Bareau 1955:123 (Smitya). 
12 On this literature, see Venkata Ramanan 1953, Bareau 1955:115 and 122, Chau 1984:7–8, 
Chau 1987:34–35 and 43–44, Lusthaus 2009:278–285. 
13 TDS 19c35: “Il est impossible de dire que l’être (sattva: pudgala) est différent des caracté-
ristiques, il serait [en conséquence] éternel (vata); et, s’il était identique aux caractéris-
tiques, il serait non éternel (avata). Ces deux erreurs ne peuvent être commises.” 
Translation Chau 1987:40. 
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behind the Buddha’s refusal to answer the question whether the soul (jva) is 
identical to or different from the body.14 
1.4. 
To claim that the pudgala does not exist as a substantial entity is tantamount to 
saying that it exists as a designation (prajñaptisat).15 This is indeed what the 
personalists did while developing a sophisticated system supposed to account for 
the pudgala as a designation.16 According to them, the pudgala is liable to three 
prajñaptis: the pudgala as designated by the basis/bases (*rayaprajñapta-
pudgala), the pudgala as designated by transmigration (*sakramaprajñapta-
pudgala), and the pudgala as designated by cessation.17 What does “basis/bases” 
(raya) refer to? First and foremost, to the five agregates, but also, according to 
the context, to the four great elements (mahbhta), the twelve sensory bases 
(yatana) and the eighteen sensory elements (dhtu). The pudgala as designated 
with reference to these bases is that which appropriates (upd-) and sustains 
the body, serves as an agent of perceptual awareness (vijñna),18 affective sensa-
tion (vedan) and ideation (sajñ), provides the basis for recollection and 
knowledge, is the possessor of serial continuity (santna). And according to the 
Buddhist personalists, the relationship between the pudgala and the psycho-
physical basis is the same as that between fire and fuel, which are neither 
identical nor distinct.19 As for the pudgala as designated by transmigration, it 
refers to that which underlies the rebirth stories (jtaka) of the (future) Buddha 
and passes from one existence to another.20 This designation is threefold: desi-
14 On the avyk	tavastus, see below, n. 71. 
15 On the distinction between dravyasat and prajñaptisat (pseudo-)entities, see below, n. 54. 
See also Lusthaus 2009:276–278. 
16 Note the wording of thesis no. 1 in Vasumitra’s account: “The pudgala is neither the same 
[as] nor different from the skandhas. It is a prajñapti dependent on the skandhas, yatanas, 
and dhtus.” Translation Lusthaus 2009:284. 
17 On these three prajñaptis, see Chau 1984:9–11, Chau 1987:35–39, Venkata Ramanan 1953: 
182–195, and Lusthaus 2009:280–281.   
18 Note thesis no. 15 of the Vtsputryas (according to the Vibh): “La personne (pudgala) 
connaît (jnti) les choses (dharma).” Translation Bareau 1955:118. 
19 On the analogy of fire and fuel, see below, n. 76. 
20 Note thesis no. 3 of the Vtsputryas (according to Vasumitra and Bhavya): “Dharmas, if 
apart from the pudgala, cannot move on from a previous lifetime to a subsequent lifetime. 
On the basis of the pudgala, one can say there is transference (sakrnti).” Translation 
Lusthaus 2009:284; see also Bareau 1955:116. However, as the S strongly insists upon, the 
pudgala is never (until the nirupadhieanirva) without a set of skandhas, and this is the 
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gnation of(/with reference to) the past (*attaprajñapti), designation of(/with 
reference to) the future (*angataprajñapti), designation of(/with reference to) 
the present (*pratyutpannaprajñapti). According to Chau, “[t]his explains (i) 
how personal continuity, being an uninterrupted flow of psycho-physical 
phenomena, not only flows in the present, but has its source in the past and 
continues to flow into the future, and (ii) how personal karmic responsability is 
possible, such that Buddhism is no longer susceptible to the charge that it is 
nihilistic and immoral.”21 Finally, the pudgala as designated by cessation points 
to the end of appropriation (updna). Its purpose is “to demonstrate that the Ta-
thgata or an arahant after attaining the nirva without remainder (nirupadhi-
eanirva) (…) is the liberated person par excellence [referred to as uttama° 
or paramapuriso], dwelling in beatitude.”22 To sum up: “Thus the pudgala, with 
its three designations, is an ineffable (avaktavya) that avoids the two extremes: 
annihilation (uccheda) and eternity (vata). The pudgala is the agent of 
knowledge, memory, the rebirth process, the ripening of actions (karmavipka), 
and, after eliminating its obstacles, dwells in beatitude.”23 
________________________________ 
reason why the Pudgalavdins strongly advocated the existence of intermediate existence 
(antarbhava). See thesis no. 33 of the Vtsputryas (according to Vasumitra) in Bareau 
1955:119, and thesis no. 10 (according to the Kathvatthu) of the Smityas in Bareau 
1955:124. Note also Venkata Ramanan 1953:187 (and 195): “Therefore leaving the body of 
the five skandhas, when all that is extinct, the person moves on from this life to another. 
Hence it is said that there is the person who leaves the five skandhas of this state (viz.) 
upapattibhava and takes up the five skandhas of the antarbhava.”   
21 Chau 1984:11, to be compared with Chau 1987:37. 
22 Chau 1984:11. 
23 Chau 1984:11. I cannot resist the temptation of quoting the following excerpt from the S 
(465a17–465b1): “Le Bouddha a dit [que l]e pudgala existe en tant que désignation 
(prajñapti). C’est pourquoi cela s’oppose à [l’opinion de] l’inexistence de la personne. S’il 
est vrai que la personne n’existe pas, alors il n’y aura pas ce qui tue ainsi que ce qui est tué. 
Il en est de même pour le vol, l’amour illicite, le mensonge, et l’absorption de l’alcool. C’est 
[la lacune de l’opinion de] l’inexistence de la personne. Si la personne n’existait pas, il n’y 
aurait pas non plus les cinq crimes majeurs; [si] les organes des sens ne produisaient pas les 
bonnes et mauvaises actions, il n’y aurait pas de lien; s’il n’y avait pas ce qui détache les 
liens, il n’y aurait pas ce qui est attaché également, et il n’y aurait ni acteur ni acte, ni 
résultat [de l’acte]. S’il n’y avait pas d’acte, il n’y aurait pas de résultat. [S’]il n’y avait pas 
d’acte, de résultat, il n’y aurait ni naissance, ni mort. Mais les êtres vivants, à cause des actes 
et de leurs résultats, transmigrent dans le cycle de la naissance et de la mort (sasra). S’il 
n’y avait ni naissance, ni mort, il n’y aurait pas de cause (hetu) de la naissance et de la mort. 
S’il n’y avait pas de cause, il n’y aurait pas de cessation de cause. S’il n’y avait pas de 
cessation de cause, il n’y aurait pas d’orientation vers la voie (mrga); ainsi, il n’y aurait pas 
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1.5. 
Among the many critiques of Buddhist personalism, Vasubandhu’s is by far the 
most systematic and, quite deservedly, the most famous: to the best of my 
knowledge, AKBh 9 (strictly speaking not a genuine chapter of the AKBh)24 has 
been translated in Western languages no less than thrice, not to speak of its 
partial translations.25 Still within the Sautrntika/Yogcra tradition, ntarakita 
and Kamalala have dedicated one section of the lengthy tmapark of the 
TS(P) to the refutation of the Buddhist pudgala. TS(P) 336–349(/K125,16–
131,9/159,16–166,18), which represents the last stage in the development of 
anti-Pudgalavda polemics in this tradition, has been translated into German by 
Schayer as early as 1931.26 However, two closely related texts have escaped 
scholarly attention. The first one is Dharmakrti’s PVSV 147,2–148,5, which has 
not even been noticed so far as a critique of Pudgalavda, 27  and where 
Dharmakrti develops an entirely new line of argument. As for the second one, it 
is MSA(Bh) 18.92–103(/154,27–160,6), the text translated in the present study. 
This passage, which is likely to represent the very inception of the Yogcra 
critique of the pudgala, has been translated into French as early as 1911 by Lévi 
and did not go unnoticed until the Second World War. In the rich “Notes 
préliminaires” to his translation of AKBh 9 (1926), de La Vallée Poussin writes: 
“[L]e Strlakra d’Asaga (édité et traduit par S. Lévi, 1907–1911), xviii.92–
________________________________ 
les quatre nobles vérités (ryasatya). S’il n’y avait pas les quatre nobles vérités, il n’y aurait 
pas de Bouddha enseignant les quatre vérités. S’il n’y avait pas de Bouddha, il n’y aurait pas 
de communauté des moines (sagha). Ainsi la réfutation du pudgala entraîne la réfutation 
du Triple Joyau (triratna) et des quatre nobles vérités. Telle est la réfutation de toutes ces 
opinions. C’est pourquoi la réfutation du pudgala fait naître les erreurs mentionnées ci-
dessus, et d’autres erreurs se produisent également. Si l’on admet que la personne (pudgala), 
le soi existe, les erreurs mentionnées ci-dessus ne se produisent pas. Comme le Bouddha l’a 
dit dans le stra, il faut le savoir exactement. C’est pourquoi la personne existe vraiment.” 
Translation Chau 1987:42–43; see also Venkata Ramanan 1953:177–178. 
24 See already Koa V.227. 
25 See Stcherbatsky 1970, Koa V.230–302 and Duerlinger 1989b/Duerlinger 2003; see 
Duerlinger 2009 and Goodman 2009. Another extremely important anti-Pudgalavdin text 
(strongly indebted to AKBh 9) is MAV 244,1–288,9 (explicitly against the Smityas 
[ma pos bkur pa, MAV 244,8; see above, n. 8]; for a topical outline of the passage, see 
Tauscher 1981:36–39). 
26 See Schayer 1931–1932. 
27 This is indeed hardly surprising considering that Dharmakrti does not even allude to the 
pudgala in this passage. 
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103, dépend dans une certaine mesure du Traité de Vasubandhu.28 – Signalons 
par exemple la discussion des rapports du feu et du combustible, l’emploi des 
mêmes textes scripturaires, la démonstration de l’inactivité du Pudgala.”29 But, 
due maybe to most of our contemporaries’ pitiable unwillingness to read French 
and failure to take into consideration the finest pieces of 20th century scholar-
ship, this important text has since then sunk into oblivion.30 That the MSA(Bh) 
and AKBh 9 quote the same scriptural sources is, in itself, no argument in favour 
of the AKBh’s indebtedness towards the MSA(Bh), since both had to counter the 
exegesis made of these loci by the Pudgalavdins themselves, i.e., are very likely 
to have drawn on their opponents’ treatises (as is made clear by the S). As for 
the discussion on the relationship between fire and fuel, it is no argument either, 
for it can also be shown to occur in at least one Pudgalavda source.31 The issue 
of the relationship between the two texts is made still more complicated by the 
question whether the author of the (MSA)Bh and the author of the AKBh were 
or not one and the same person.32 Whatever be the case, the MSA(Bh) provides 
extremely interesting arguments against the pudgala and is to be considered as 
an important milestone in the history of this debate. 
1.6. 
There can be no point in attempting to summarize or paraphrase the many argu-
ments put forward in our passage. Suffice it to say that, as nearly all Buddhist 
polemical tracts before the rise of the so-called epistemological literature, the 
MSA(Bh) uses a twofold argumentative strategy against the pudgala: first, by 
reason(ing) (yukti), i.e., by resorting to the first two means of valid cognition 
(prama), perception (pratyaka) and inference (anumna), and second, by 
(authoritative) scriptures (gama), the third means of valid cognition recognized 
by all the Yogcras before Dignga. But what does “against the pudgala” mean 
in this context? As we have seen, the Pudgalavdin claims that the pudgala 
cannot be said to be either identical to or different from the skandhas. His 
adversary summons him to make a choice: either does the pudgala exist as a 
substantial entity (dravyasat), and then it must be either the same as or distinct 
28 Note that the MSA (if not the Bh) predates the AKBh from at least one century. 
29 Koa V.229. 
30 No less neglected, and probably for the same reason, is the Mahprajñpramitstra’s 
interesting refutation of the pudgala, translated into French by Lamotte in 1949. See Traité 
II.735–750. 
31 See below, n. 76. 
32 For a summary and new light on this problem, see Franco/Preisendanz 2010:XV–XVII. 
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from the skandhas, or it merely exists as an entity of designation (prajñaptisat, a 
“nominal fiction” [Lusthaus]), and then it can rightly be said to be neither 
identical to nor different from the skandhas. In other words, either the pudgala 
exists (as the Pudgalavdin pretends), and then the claim that it is neither the 
same as nor distinct from the skandhas is false, or it does not exist, and the 
silence of the Buddha in teachings such as the Vatsagotrastra finds its 
justification. As for scriptural argumentation, it is made a rather complicated 
issue insofar as both parties rely on (supposedly) canonical literature in order to 
make their point.33 The philosophical quarrel then turns to an exegetical one, for 
the Buddha, no one would dare to contend, has often made use of the notion of 
pudgala. Now, did he resort to it in a purely pragmatic and didactic purpose, as 
the adversary of the pudgala repeatedly contends, or did his statements con-
cerning the pudgala refer to an ens – whatever its precise ontological status – as 
the Pudgalavdin (allegedly) has it?  
2. The Immediate Context of MSA(Bh) 18.92–103 
2.1. 
One should be wary of restricting MSA(Bh) 18.92–103 to its polemical dimen-
sion, for its intra-textual context suggests yet another, soteriologically oriented 
meaning. Like the closely parallel chapter of the BoBh (1.17), MSA(Bh) 18 is 
dedicated to the factors that are “aids” to awakening (bodhipakya° or bodhi-
pkikadharma).34 In both chapters, these factors (traditionally held to amount to 
thirty-seven), are discussed at length in a sixteen-item list. In both chapters 
again, the last two items consist of three concentrations (samdhi) and four 
summary statements of doctrine (dharmoddna). 
2.2. 
MSA 18.77–81/MSABh 148,6–149,12 deals with three kinds of concentration 
endowed each with a specific domain (gocara) and purpose (artha):35 the con-
33 For a very suggestive example, see below, n. 103. 
34 On the 37 bodhipkikadharmas and their various classifications, see Traité III.1119–1207; 
see also Dayal 1970:80–164. 
35 On these three kinds of concentration (called also the three “doors of liberation,” vimoka-
mukha), see Traité III.1209–1232, and Koa V.184–192; in the context of the thirty-seven 
bodhipkikadharmas, see BoBh W276,2–277,4/D187,15–188,8. Note that, properly speak-
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centration on emptiness (nyatsamdhi) bears on and aims at the thorough 
knowledge (parijñ) of the two kinds of selflessness, viz. the selflessness of the 
(pseudo-)person (pudgalanairtmya) and of the factors (dharmanairtmya); the 
unfocused concentration (apraihitasamdhi) bears on and aims at ridding one-
self (praha) of the basis of the (false) belief in a self (tmagrha) regarding 
these two selflessnesses, viz., the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality to 
which one clings (updnaskandha); the signless concentration36 (nimittasam-
dhi) bears on and aims at the direct realization (sktkriy) of the absolute 
calmness (atyantopaama) of the basis of this false belief.37 One may wonder 
why, among the numerous concentrations alluded to in Buddhist literature, these 
three alone are listed as bodhipkika factors. Whereas the MSA(Bh) remains 
silent on this point, the BoBh provides an interesting answer: “But why are only 
________________________________ 
ing, MSA(Bh) 18.80–81/148,23–149,12 already belongs to the section devoted to the four 
dharmoddnas.  
36 On the meaning of animitta and nimitta in early Yogcra thought, see Schmithausen 1969: 
121–22n. 79. 
37 To be compared with (1) the Abhidharmic understanding of the three samdhis as summa-
rized by Ghoaka (Abhidharmm	ta T 1553, 975c1–9, translated in Traité III.1214): “Les 
trois samdhi sont nyat-, apraihita- et nimittasamdhi. C’est parce que la pensée 
prend pour objet l’Ansrava, qu’ils sont appelés samdhi. Concentré, l’ascète voit les cinq 
agrégats d’attachement (updnaskandha) comme vides (nya), privés de moi (antman) et 
de mien (antmya): voilà le nyatsamdhi. Entré en ce samdhi, il ne souhaite plus 
amour (rga), haine (dvea), aberration (moha) ni renaissance (punarbhava): voilà l’aprai-
hitasamdhi. Il est un samdhi dont l’objet (lambana) est exempt de dix caractères 
(nimitta). Quels sont ces dix? Les cinq objets, matière, etc. (rpdipañcaviaya), l’homme 
(purua), la femme (str), la naissance (jti), la vieillesse (jar) et l’impermanence 
(anityat). Voilà l’nimittasamdhi.” The MSA(Bh)’s ideas are much closer to the 
“mdhyamika” Traité (III.1223). Here, the unyatsamdhi has two aspects: “1. Parce 
qu’elle considère (samanupayati) les cinq agrégats d’attachement (pañca updnaskandha) 
comme n’ayant ni identité (ekatva) ni différence (anyatva), elle est ‘vide’ (nya). 2. Parce 
qu’elle considère le moi (tman) et le mien (tmya) comme inexistants (anupalabdha), elle 
est ‘sans moi’ (antmaka).” Among the four aspects of the apraihitasamdhi, two are of 
interest to us: “1. Parce qu’elle considère les cinq agrégats d’attachement (pañcopd-
naskandha) comme issus de causes et de conditions (hetupratyayaja), elle est ‘imperma-
nente’ (anitya). 2. Parce qu’elle les considère comme des tourments du corps et de l’esprit 
(kyikamnasikavihe
hana), elle est ‘douleur’ (dukha).” As for the first two aspects of the 
nimittasamdhi, they are as follows:  “1. Parce qu’elle considère le Nirva comme la 
destruction de toutes les sortes de douleurs (nnvidhadukhanirodha), elle est ‘destruction’ 
(nirodha). 2. Parce qu’elle le considère comme l’extinction du feu du triple poison (trivia) 
et des autres passions (klea), elle est ‘calme’ (nta).” 
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these three concentrations mentioned, [and] not [others] beyond these, not more 
than these? [Because all] this [consists of] two [things]: that which exists and 
that which does not exist. Among them, what is conditioned and what is 
unconditioned are that which exists, [whereas] that which does not exist 
[consists in] either the self or what belongs to the self. In this regard, the un-
focused concentration is singled out (vyavasthna) because it is not intent upon, 
i.e., because it is adverse to [that part of] existent [things that is] conditioned. As 
for signless concentration, it is singled out because it is intent upon, i.e., because 
it takes perfect delight in the unconditioned nirva. As for that thing which is 
non-existent, the bodhisattva should be neither intent upon nor non-intent upon 
it, but simply consider it correctly as non-existent. And one should know that it 
is with reference to this way of considering [non-existent things] that the 
concentration on emptiness is singled out.” 38  In other words, these three 
samdhis do not only cover the entire realm of being and non-being. They also 
encapsulate, so to say as its meditative counterparts, the whole Buddhist path in 
that they are instrumental in the bodhisattva’s reluctance towards conditioned 
factors, his fondness for the unconditioned nirva, and his rejection of false 
views that are responsible for defilements, entanglement in sasra and 
suffering. It is, then, hardly surprising that statements of a more doctrinal nature 
be supplied in order to provide these all-inclusive meditative and salvational 
devices with a theoretical foundation. And such is indeed the case of the four 
summary statements of doctrine that form the last item of the bodhipakya list. 
As MSA 18.80ac has it, “four summary statements of doctrine have been 
preached [by the perfectly awakened buddhas] to the bodhisattvas as [being] the 
basis (upaniad) of [these three] concentrations.” 39  What do these summary 
statements of doctrine consist of? According to the BoBh, “these four summary 
statements of doctrine [are those] which both the buddhas and the bodhisattvas 
teach in order to purify the living beings. Which four [are they]? [First, there is] 
38 BoBh W276,15–25/D187,24–188,5: kasmt punar em eva tray samdhn 
prajñaptir bhavati / nta uttari nto bhya / dvayam ida sac csac ca / tatra sask	tam 
asask	ta ca sad asad tm vtmya v / tatra sask	te saty apraidhnata 
prtiklyato 'praihitasamdhivyavasthnam / asask	te punar nirve praidhnata 
samyagabhiratigrahaato nirnimittasamdhivyavasthnam / yat punar etad asad eva vastu 
tatra bodhisattvena na praidhna npraidhna karayam / api tu tad asad* ity eva 
yathbhta dra
avyam / tac ca daranam adhik	tya nyatsamdhivyavasthna 
veditavyam /. *asad WT: asad asad D. 
39 MSA 18.80ac: samdhyupaniattvena dharmoddnacatu
ayam / deita bodhisattvebhya 
[…]. 
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the summary statement of doctrine [saying] that all conditioned factors are 
impermanent. [Second, there is] the summary statement of doctrine [saying] that 
all conditioned factors are painful. [Third, there is] the summary statement of 
doctrine [saying] that all factors are selfless. [Fourth, there is] the summary 
statement of doctrine [saying] that extinction is peaceful. Since the buddhas and 
bodhisattvas mainly preach (udrayanti) to the living beings a doctrine whose 
meaning is related to them, they are called ‘summary statements of doctrine.’ 
And since they have been constantly proclaimed [and produced], again and 
again (uditodita),40 by peacefully minded sages of old, they are called ‘summary 
statements.’ And since [they are] the path leading to the great[est] prosperity 
(udaya) and going upwards (rdhva) to the peak of existence, they are called 
‘summary statements.’”41 How do these four summary statements relate to the 
three above-mentioned concentrations? According to the MSABh (149,1–3), 
“anity sarvasaskr” and “dukh sarvasaskr” serve as the basis of 
unfocused concentration, “antmna sarvadharm” as the basis of the con-
centration on emptiness, and “nta nirvam” as the basis of signless concen-
tration.  
2.3. 
As one of the etymologizing explanations provided by the BoBh has it, “the 
buddhas and bodhisattvas mainly preach to the living beings a doctrine whose 
meaning is related” to these four summary statements. Indeed, these summaries 
of the Law encapsulate at least two among the latter’s most characteristic 
doctrinal commitments, viz. impermanence and selflessness. Now, as every 
40 The BoBh is likely to pun on the two meanings of Skt. udita, viz. “spoken” (< vad) and 
“born” (< udi), as is testified to by the interpretive Tibetan translation (BoBhtib wi 
D146b1): dus rtag tu 'byu 	i 'byu ba'i phyir (uditoditatvt < udi) ya thub pa thugs 	i 
ba sa ma rnams kyis rtag tu brjod ci brjod pa'i phyir (uditoditatvt < vad) ya mdo 	es 
bya'o //. 
41 BoBh W277,5–15/D188,9–16: catvrmni dharmoddnni yni buddh ca bodhisattv 
ca sattvn viuddhaye deayanti / katamni catvri / anity sarvasaskr iti dharmod-
dnam / dukh sarvasaskr iti dharmoddnam / antmna sarvadharm iti dharmod-
dnam / nta nirvam iti dharmoddnam / etatpratisayuktrtha yadbhyas 
dharmam udrayanti buddhabodhisattv sattvnm / tasmd etni dharmoddnnty 
ucyante / paurai* ca ntamnasair munibhir uditoditatvn nityaklam uddnnty 
ucyante / mahodayagmin bhavgrordhvagmin cai**  pratipat tasmd uddnnty 
ucyante /. *paurai em.: paure D, purai W; **bhavgrordhvagmin cai DT: 
bhavgrc ca gmin W. On the dharmoddnas, see also Ak 150,8–39 and Braarvig 
1993:561–565, BoBh W277,5–284,7/D188,9–192,20, BHSD s.v. uddna. 
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doctrinal statement within Buddhist scholastics, these two ought to be admitted 
not only on the basis of scripture, but also after an evaluation through reason-
(ing), viz. through the two remaining means of valid cognition, perception and 
inference. This evaluation is nearly coextensive with the insight born of 
(rational) reflection (cintmay prajñ) by means of which a bodhisattva 
assesses the truth-value of scriptural contents (ruta) before he subjects them to 
a nearly endless mental cultivation (bhvan).42 And except for its conclusive 
statement (MSA[Bh] 18.104/160,9), the rest of MSA(Bh) 18 is devoted to the 
demonstration (prasdhana) of momentariness (kaikatva, MSA[Bh] 18.82–
91/149,12–154,26) and selflessness (i.e., pudgalanairtmya, MSA[Bh] 18.92–
103/154,27–160,6).43 As we can see, rational argumentation and philosophy are 
first and foremost aimed at providing soteriologically relevant dogmas and the 
subsequent meditative practices with indisputable, supposedly value-free foun-
dations. As our text makes clear, the proof of selflessness proceeds in a negative, 
polemic way by attempting to refute the coreligionists’s claims to the existence 
of a real pudgala that would abandon the skandhas at death and take on new 
ones at rebirth.44 But this polemical endeavour does not cease to belong to the 
cintmay level: the Buddhist scriptures are replete with allusions to the pudgala, 
allusions out of which fellow Buddhist doctors have developed a systematic 
doctrine with its own claims to legitimacy and salvational efficacy; these 
42 On yukti and the cintmay prajñ, see Yoshimizu 1996:114–119n. 85, Deleanu 
2006:II.494-495n. 74 and Eltschinger 2009. 
43 Note that the corresponding passage of the BoBh (W280,18–281,1/D190,17–22) contains no 
proof of selflessness, but the following statement: puna sarvadharm bodhisattva 
sask	tsask	tn dvividha nairtmya yathbhta prajnti / pudgalanairtmya 
dharmanairtmya ca / tatreda pudgalanairtmya yan naiva te vidyamn dharm 
pudgal / npi vidyamnadharmavinirmukto ‘nya pudgalo vidyate / tatreda dharma-
nairtmya yat sarvev abhilpyeu vastuu sarvbhilpasvabhvo dharmo na savidyate* 
/ eva hi bodhisattva sarvadharm antmna iti yathbhta prajnti /. *Note BoBhtib 
wi D148a3: brjod par bya ba’i dos po thams cad la brjod pa’i o bo ñid kyi chos thams cad 
med pa ste. “Next, the bodhisattva correctly discerns the twofold selflessness of all 
conditioned and unconditioned factors, [viz.] the selflessness of the (pseudo-)person and the 
selflessness of the factors. Among them, the selflessness of the (pseudo-)person is that 
neither are these [really] existing factors pudgalas nor is there another pudgala [that would 
be] independent of [these really] existing factors. Among them, the selflessness of the 
factors is that no [verbally] expressible entity possesses a factor [such as it would] have [any 
of] all [these verbal] expressions for its nature. And thus does the bodhisattva correctly 
discern that all factors are selfless.” This way of accounting for dharmanairtmya and 
nyat is but a short sketch of the one developed at length in BoBh 1.4 (Tattvrthapa
ala). 
44 See above, n. 20. 
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scriptures are, then, in need of an ad hoc exegesis designed to dispell doubts 
regarding their internal (in)consistency. One or two centuries later, however, the 
celebrated Buddhist polygraph Sthiramati (500–570 in Valabh) provides an 
altogether different interpretation of MSA[Bh] 18.92–103/154,27–160,6: “By 
showing before [that all conditioned factors are] momentary, selfless[ness] has 
then been [eo ipso] demonstrated since [all] that which is momentary is [also] 
selfless. However, outsiders (*trthika) and ordinary people (*laukika) wrongly 
believe in the existence of a self (*tman), of an agent (*kart	), of a seer 
(*dra
	), of an experiencer (*vedaka), of a man (*mnava) and of a human 
(*manuja)45 that are distinct from the skandhas. [The MSA(Bh) now] demon-
strates the selflessness of the (pseudo-)person by [adducing] other [i.e., specific 
logical] reasons (*hetu) so that [these outsiders and ordinary people] abandon 
their wrong notion (*viparysa).”46 Although Sthiramati alludes here and there 
to a Smitya Buddhist opponent,47 his introductory statement interprets the 
whole passage as a refutation of the non-Buddhists’ substantialist assumptions, 
thus mirroring the deep shift that took place at the turn of the 6th century CE in 
the aims and the targets of the Buddhist intellectuals.48 
3. On the Present Translation 
My translation is based on Sylvain Lévi’s editio princeps (1907, L), on the two 
extant Nepalese manuscripts of the MSABh (MS A/B), on the Tibetan version of 
the text (MSABhtib) and on Sthiramati’s massive commentary (MSAVBh, pre-
served in its Tibetan translation only). To these materials, one must add the text-
critical footnotes of Sylvain Lévi’s French translation (1911), which often reflect 
45 According to TSD 2360b, Tib. ed may render Skt. manu, while Tib. ed bu may render Skt. 
mnava and Tib. ed bdag, Skt. tman. However, in an enumeration close to Sthiramati’s, 
Ak 11,29 has ed bu (var. ed can) da ed las skyes, which Braarvig (1993:II.44) renders: 
°mnavamanuja°, and which I follow for want of a better hypothesis. 
46 MSAVBh tsi D162b6–7/P191a7–b1: go du skad cig mar bstan pa’i sgo nas ya ga skad 
cig ma yin pa de (em.: DP des) bdag med pa yin pas de’i skabs su bdag med par (D: P pa) 
bsgrubs zin mod kyi / mu stegs pa da / ‘jig rten pa dag phu po la ma gtogs pa’i bdag da / 
byed pa po da / lta ba po da / tshor ba po da / ed can da ed bdag la sogs pa yod par 
phyin ci log tu mon par 	en te / de dag gi phyin ci log da bral ba’i phyir gtan tshigs g	an 
(D: P om. g	an) gyis kya ga zag la bdag med pa sgrub bo //. 
47 See below, nn. 53, 72, 73, 83. 
48 See Eltschinger forthcoming 2. 
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a more accurate understanding of the text than the 1907 edition, and the parallel 
passages of AKBh 9 (generally quoted in their Sanskrit original without trans-
lation). The identification of the passages quoted or alluded to in the MSABh 
and the MSAVBh has been greatly facilitated by the very useful work of Kensho 
Okada and Sayaka Kishi (2007 and 2008), by La Vallée Poussin’s footnotes to 
his French translation of AKBh 9 (Koa V) and by Ejima’s philological notes as 
reproduced in Lee’s new edition of AKBh 9 (LE). I have also taken much 
benefit of Vairocanarakita’s short glosses on the basis of Kazuo Kano’s pro-
visional edition of the codex unicus (Vairocanarakita MS). My translation and 
annotations owe much to my close reading of Sthiramati’s MSAVBh. But how 
should we proceed with this bulky commentary? It is fair to say that Sthiramati’s 
explanations were almost certainly meant for an untrained audience – for 
blas.49 In other words, most of this commentary is not worthy of a translation. I 
have limited myself to summarizing and paraphrasing it while providing Sans-
krit equivalents (then always preceded by an asterisk). My own text-critical 
remarks are to be found in a separate section at the end of the translation. 
Although much remains to be done, I sincerely hope to have succeeded in 
making the text intelligible and to attract the attention of scholars to a very 
significant milestone in the history of the “mainstream” Buddhists’ arguments 
against the Pudgalavda. 
4. MSA(Bh) 18.92–103/154,27–160,6 
In order to demonstrate the selflessness [pertaining] to the pudgala, [the MSA 
now devotes] twelve stanzas [i.e., MSA 18.92–103] to the elucidation (vibhga) 
of selflessness: 
 The pudgala must be said to exist as a [mere] designation (prajñaptyastitay), but not as a 
[real] substance (dravyatas), because one does not perceive [it], because [our pseudo-per-
ception of the pudgala] is [nothing but] a wrong notion (viparysa), because it is a pollution 
(saklea), because [the personalistic false view] is the cause of [that which is] defiled 
(kli
a). (MSA 18.92) 
 This [pudgala] cannot be said to be either one [and the same] with or distinct from the [basis 
of its designation, i.e., from the five skandhas], because of the two faults [that would ensue]: 
for [if the skandhas and the pudgala were one and the same,] the skandhas would be 
49 For a good example of this, see below, n. 73. 
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(prasaga) the self, and [if the skandhas and the pudgala were distinct,] the [pudgala] 
would be a [real] substance. (MSA 18.93) 
 If [the pudgala] exists as a [real] substance and [at the same time] cannot be said [to be 
either one and the same with or distinct from the skandhas, then you] have to state the 
reason (prayojana) [for this], [because a real pudgala] cannot be said to be neither one [and 
the same with] nor distinct [from the skandhas] without a reason [being provided for the 
denial of each of the two propositions]. (MSA 18.94) 
 Because of [their distinct] characteristics, because of [that which is] observed in the [ordi-
nary] world and because of the [authoritative] treatises [that speak to the contrary], it is not 
correct [to affirm] that fuel and fire cannot be said [to be either one and the same or distinct 
from one another], for one indeed perceives [them] as [being] two. (MSA 18.95) 
 Since a cognition arises provided two [factors only] are present,50 the [pudgala] is not [its 
causal] condition, because [such a pudgala] is useless. Therefore, the [pudgala] cannot be a 
seer, [and this] up to a liberator. (MSA 18.96) 
 Or, if [the pudgala] presided over [the rise of a cognition],51 neither would it bring about a 
[pleasurable cognition that would be] impermanent, nor [would it ever bring about] an un-
desirable one. [Moreover,] its operation and characteristic are to be established. [Additio-
nally, the Blessed One’s] threefold complete awakening [would get] ruined [if the pudgala 
existed as a real substance]. (MSA 18.97) 
 Furthermore, its effort in order to see, etc., is not self-arisen, because of all the three [faults 
that are to be presented below]. [Nor can the pudgala serve as] the [causal] condition of this 
effort. Seeing, etc., lacking an effort[, cannot have the pudgala for its agent]. (MSA 18.98) 
 Because the [pudgala] would no [longer] be an agent, because [the exertion] is imperma-
nent, [and] because [exertion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this pudgala’s] 
effort in order to see [something visible], etc., cannot be self-arisen. (MSA 18.99) 
 Neither a [pudgala] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [pudgala] can be the 
[causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three 
reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before[, hence cannot be due to a permanent 
cause]; because [this pudgala] would [ipso facto] be impermanent; and because there is no 
third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a pudgala that would be neither permanent nor im-
permanent]. (MSA 18.100) 
 And [this can also be demonstrated by resorting to scripture,] because [the Blessed One has] 
taught [that] all dharmas are selfless, [that] ultimately [there is nothing but] emptiness, and 
[that] to perceive a self is harmful. (MSA 18.101) 
 Because by [resorting to the designation of] pudgala, one [can, as did the Blessed One,] in-
dicate differences in addiction and [mental] series concerning defilement and purification,52 
which vary [each] according to degree and party. (MSA 18.102) 
50 On the reading: dvaye sati ca, see below, text-critical remarks (L157,3). 
51 I have read: svmitve sati v- instead of: svmitve sati c-. See below, text-critical remarks 
(L157,5). 
52 I have read: saklee vyavadne ca instead of: sakleavyavadne ca. See below, text-
critical remarks (L159,3). 
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 [The Blessed One did not have to teach the pudgala, because] the view of a self is not to be 
generated [anew in the living beings], [because their] cultivation [of it] is beginningless [and 
therefore does not need to be taught], [and because if salvation presupposed the knowledge 
of the pudgala,] all [living beings could] achieve liberation without effort. There is either no 
liberation [at all] or no [substantially existing] pudgala. (MSA 18.103) 
[The Pudgalavdin:53] Should one say that the pudgala exists, [or] should one 
[rather] say that it does not exist? [The MSA] answers: The pudgala must be said 
53 Sthiramati (MSAVBh tsi D163a1–4/P191b2–6) introduces the opponent as follows: ’di ltar 
bcom ldan ’das kyis kya so so’i skye bo’i ga zag da / rgyun du 	ugs pa’i ga zag da / 
lan cig phyir ’o ba’i ga zag da / phyir mi ’o ba’i ga zag da / dgra bcom pa’i ga zag 
da / bya chub sems dpa’i ga zag da / ga zag gcig ’jig rten du ’byu ba na ’jig rten kun 
la phan pa da bde bar byed pa ste / ’di ltar de b	in gegs pa’i ga zag go 	es gsus la / ra 
gi sde pa las kya sam (em.: a sam D, a sa P) bi ti pa dag phu po da gcig pa ya ma yin 
/ tha dad pa ya ma yin pa’i ga zag rdzas su yod la / tshig gis brjod du med par ya ’dod 
ci / mu stegs pa da ’jig rten pa dag bdag da ga zag yod par ’dod na / khyed ga zag 
med par ’dod pa rnams ga zag ces bya ba ’di yod pa 	ig tu ’dod dam / med pa 	ig tu ’dod 
pa smros (D: P smos) ig ces dri’o //. “The Blessed One (*bhagavat) has said: ‘The [good] 
ordinary person (*p	thagjanapudgala), the person who has entered the stream (*srotapan-
napudgala), the person who returns [only] once [to the sphere of desire] (*sak	dgmi-
pudgala), the person who does not return [any longer to the sphere of desire] (*ang-
mipudgala), the person who is a saint (*arhatpudgala), the person who is a bodhisattva 
(*bodhisattvapudgala), and the one (*eka) person who, when he appears in the world, 
causes welfare (*hita) and happiness (*sukha), i.e., the person who is a Tathgata (*tath-
gatapudgala).’* Even among [our] coreligionists (*svaythya), the Smityas admit that 
the pudgala, which is neither one [and the same] as the constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality 
(*skandha) nor distinct (*bhinna) [from them], exists as a [real] substance (*dravyasat) and 
is unspeakable (*avaktavya); and the outsiders (*trthika) as well as the worldly [persons] 
(*laukika) admit that the self (*tman) and the pudgala exist. [These opponents now] ask: 
‘You who admit that the pudgala does not exist ought to say [now] whether you accept that 
what is called pudgala exists or whether you accept that it does not exist.’” *To be 
compared with Ak 118,26–33 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:93, and Braarvig 1993:II.452–
453 for a translation); parts of the stra (?) are also quoted in AKBh 468,16/LE90,9 (eka 
pudgalo loka utpadyamna utpadyata iti), TSP K126,6–7/160,12–13 (eka pudgalo loka 
utpadyamna utpadyate yadvat tathgata iti), and S (463a14 and 463c28 according to 
LE90n. 343 [see Venkata Ramanan 1953:170 and 173] with further references to T 2, 
561a18, T 2, 569b24, AN I.22 [I, XIII, 1]). The list of the pudgalas in Ak further includes 
the person following his faith (raddhnusr pudgala), the person following religious 
teaching (dharmnusr pudgala), the person on the eighth stage (a
amaka pudgala), 
the person being an isolated buddha (pratyekabuddha pudgala). For definitions of these 
pudgalas, see Braarvig 1993:II.453–454n. 1. See also below, n. 109. Whatever its exact 
origin, this text belongs, according to Bareau 1955:115, to the most oft-quoted ones in 
Vtsputrya circles. On the Pudgalavdins’ original views regarding the different pudgalas 
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to exist as a [mere] designation (prajñaptyastit), but not as a [real] substance 
(dravyatas) [MSA 18.92ab].54 55And because one can say [with equal legitimacy] 
that [the pudgala] exists as a [mere] designation [and] that it does not exist as a 
[real] substance, in thus adopting a conditional position (anekavda) [on the 
pudgala], there is no room at all either for the fault of [affirming its absolute] 
existence or for the fault of [affirming its absolute] non-existence. [The Pudgala-
vdin:] But how can one know that this [pudgala] does not exist as a [real] 
substance? [Answer:] Because one does not perceive [it] [MSA 18.92c1]. Indeed, 
contrary to [dharmas] such as visible [things], this [pudgala] is not perceived as 
a [real] substance.56 [The Pudgalavdin:57] But what is called “perception” [also 
________________________________ 
engaged on the path, see Chau 1984:13–15, Chau 1987:46–48 and Venkata Ramanan 1953: 
205–211. 
54 According to MSAVBh tsi D163a6–7/P191b8–192a1, the MSA relies here on Ak (‘phags 
pa blo gros mi zad pa’i mdo) 118,34–35 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:94): ga zag gi sgra de 
dag thams cad ni de b	in gegs pa’i kun rdzob kyi tshig gi gnas kyis sems can rnams dra 
ba’i phyir bstan pa ste /. “All those words for persons are taught by the Tathgata from the 
standpoint of conventional phrases to guide beings.” Translation Braarvig 1993:II.454. 
According to MSAVBh tsi D163a1/P191b2, words like “designation” (*prajñapti), “mere 
word” (tshig tsam = vacanamtra?), “mere conventional expression” (*vyavahramtra) 
and “mere name” (*nmamtra) on the one side, and “existing as a [real] substance” 
(*dravyasat), “existing as a [real] nature” (ra b	in yod = svabhvasat?) and “existing ulti-
mately” (*paramrthasat) on the other side are synonymous (*ekrtha). The pudgala exists 
as a mere verbal designation, as a noun and a conventional expression only. To be compared 
with AKBh 461,14–17/LE 38,1–5: yat tarhi vtsputry pudgala santam icchanti / 
vicrya tvad etat / ki te dravyata icchanty hosvit prajñaptita / ki ceda dravyata iti 
ki v prajñaptita / rpdivad bhvntara ced dravyata / krdivat samudya cet pra-
jñaptita /. Yaomitra adduces other classical examples of prajñaptisat (pseudo-)entities 
(AKVy 699,12–14): yath krag	hasendika rparasagandhaspra
avyebhyas t	ak-

he
ikdibhyo hastyavarathdibhya ca na bhvntaram iyate /. On the (partly parallel) 
distinction between sav	tisat and paramrthasat, see AK 6.4, AKBh 333,23–334,13 and 
Koa IV.139–142; see also Katsura 1976. 
55 According to MSAVBh tsi D163a7–b1/P192a2–3, the Pudgalavdin now objects as follows: 
Either you adopt (*grah-) the thesis (*paka, *aa) that the pudgala exists (but you don’t 
say that it exists), or you adopt the thesis that the pudgala does not exist (but you don’t say 
that it doesn’t exist). Why do you say that it exists as a mere verbal designation and that it 
does not exist as a real substance? Why don’t you hold an unconditional position (*ek-
avda)?  
56 According to MSAVBh tsi D163b5–7/P192a8–b2, there are two means of valid cognition 
(*prama) establishing (*sdh-) that entities (*vastu) exist as real substances (*dravya-
sat): perception (*pratyakaprama) and inference (*anumnaprama). And insofar as 
objects like visible things (*rpa), etc., up to mental events (*dharma), exist, they are per-
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consists in] a cognition by the intellect (buddhi).58 Now, it is not the case that 
[we] Pudgalavdins do not cognize the pudgala through the intellect. Moreover, 
the Blessed One has said: “In this very life, [the living being] perceives an 
tman, designates [an tman].”59 How then [can the pudgala be said] not [to be] 
perceived? [Answer:] It is not the case that, when it is perceived in this way, the 
________________________________ 
ceived (*upalabh-) by the sense-faculties (*indriya), the direct perceptual awarenesses 
(*vijñna), etc. But no sense-faculty or direct perceptual awareness cognizes the pudgala. 
Therefore, since it is not grasped by perception, it does not exist as a real substance. Here, 
Sthiramati refers to the classification of dharmas into 18 sensory elements (dhtu; 6 viayas, 
6 indriyas, 6 vijñnas). See AK 1.14ab, AKBh 10,10–11 and Koa I.27. To be compared 
with AKBh 461,6–8 and 14–15/LE 36,3–6 and 12 (Koa V.231–232): pratyaknumn-
bhvt / ye hi dharm santi te pratyakam upalabdhir bhavaty asaty antarye / 
tadyath a viay manasa ca / anumna ca / tadyath pañcnm indriym / 
[…] na caivam tmano 'stti nsty tm /. 
57 According to MSAVBh tsi D163b7–164a1/P192b3 (*pudgalavdin). That this is an 
objection is also testified to by Vairocanarakita’s (MS 42b2) gloss: upalabdhir itydi 
codyam /. 
58 According to MSAVBh tsi D164a1–4/P192b3–7, one cannot claim that only (*kevalam) that 
which is cognized (*d	-) by the (corporeal) sense-faculties exists as a real substance 
(*dravyasat), for there are things existing as real substances which, though they are not 
perceived by the (corporeal) sense-faculties, are cognized by the intellect (*buddhi), like 
thought and the mental factors (*cittacaitta). Therefore, “perceived” (*upalabdha) can also 
refer to things that are grasped by mental awareness (*manovijñna). According to the 
Pudgalavdin, then, insofar as the pudgala is made perceptible (*pratyakk	ta) by the 
intellect, it is grasped by perception (*pratyakaprama) and therefore exists as a real 
substance. I haven’t succeeded so far in locating any clear-cut Pudgalavdin statement to the 
effect that the pudgala is grasped by mental awareness alone (the S remains silent on this 
important issue). According to the Vtsputrya/Smitya of AK 9 (AKBh 463,11–14/LE 
52,2–7, Koa V.238), the pudgala is grasped by all the six vijñnas, but in an indirect 
manner: abhir apty ucyate / katha k	tv / cakurvijñeyni ced rpi prattya pudgala 
prativibhvayati cakurvijñeya pudgalo vaktavya / no tu vaktavyo rpi v no v / eva 
yvan manovijñeyñ ced dharmn prattya pudgala prativibhvayati / manovijñeya 
pudgalo vaktavyo no tu vaktavyo dharm v no v / (Yaomitra [AKVy 701,8] explains 
prativibhvayati as: upalakayati tadupdnatvt, i.e., “one distinguishes [it] in a secondary 
way, because [the pudgala] has these [things] for its basis”). On the manovijñna, see Koa 
V.242–243n. 3 and, in the context of the perceptibility of the pudgala, AKBh 467,1–
2/LE80,2–3 (Koa V.252) and AKBh 463,10ff./LE52,1ff. (Koa V.238ff). See also Traité 
II.735–736 and n. 1. 
59 Unidentified (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:94–95). 
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[pudgala] is perceived as a [real] substance.60 [The Pudgalavdin:] For which 
reason? [Answer:] Because [the pseudo-perception of the pudgala] is [nothing 
but] a wrong notion (viparysa) [MSA 18.92c2].61 Indeed, the Blessed One has 
said that to [take] the selfless as a self is a wrong notion. Therefore, to grasp a 
pudgala in this way is [nothing but] a wrong notion. [The Pudgalavdin:] How is 
it known that [to grasp a pudgala is a wrong notion]? [Answer:] Because it is a 
pollution (saklea) [MSA 18.92d1].62 Indeed, this pollution is characterized as 
[that] defilement [which consists in] the personalistic [false] view, i.e., [that 
which expresses itself in the form] of “I” [and] “mine.”63 64Now, that which is 
not a wrong notion (aviparysa) cannot be a pollution.65 [The Pudgalavdin:] 
And how can one know that this very [false view] is a pollution? [Answer:] 
Because [the personalistic false view] is the cause of [that which is] defiled 
60 According to MSAVBh tsi D164b1–2/P193a5–7, the scriptural locus advocated by the 
Pudgalavdin has not been preached by the Blessed One with a view (*abhiprya) to affirm 
that the pudgala exists as a real substance (*dravyasat), but rather with a view to affirm that 
living beings (*sattva) speak erroneously (phyin ci log tu smra ba) when they claim to see 
(*d	-) and to perceive (*upalabh-) the self (*tman) in spite of there being no self. 
61 Wrong notions are traditionally held to be four in number: permanent (nitya), pleasurable 
(sukha), pure/good (uci/ubha), self (tman). AKBh 283,5–7 (Koa IV.21): catvro vipary-
s / anitye nityam iti / dukhe sukham iti / aucau ucti / antmany tmeti /. “[There are] 
four wrong notions: to take what is impermanent as permanent; to take what is painful as 
pleasurable; to take what is impure as pure; to take what is selfless as a self.” On the four 
viparysas, see e.g. Traité II.925n. 1, Lévi 1911:237n. 1, May 1959:190–205. 
62 According to MSAVBh tsi D164b4–5/P193b1–2, pollution is sixfold: desire (*rga), hostili-
ty (kho khro ba = pratigha?), (self-)conceit (a rgyal = (asmi)mna?), nescience (*avidy), 
false view (*d	
i), and doubt (*saaya). I am not aware of any other occurrence of this 
sixfold list. On the meaning of saklea, see Schmithausen 1987:II.246–247n. 21 and May 
1959:97–98n. 226. 
63 On the satkyad	
i, see Koa V.15–17, Traité II.737n. 3 and Eltschinger forthcoming 1. 
64 According to MSAVBh tsi D164b6/P193b3–4, the Pudgalavdin now objects as follows: 
The false view of the pudgala (*pudgalad	
i) may well have the character of a pollution 
(*saklealakaa), still it does not have the character of a wrong notion (*viparysa-
lakaa). 
65 According to MSAVBh tsi D164b7–165a1/P193b4–7, all that which is pollution (*sa-
klea) is wrong notion (*viparysa), as to grasp (*grahaa) something as permanent 
(*nitya) or good (*ubha), and nothing non-polluted is a wrong notion, as to grasp some-
thing as impermanent (*anitya) or offensive (*aubha). Therefore, if to grasp something as 
the self (*tman) or the pudgala has the character of pollution (*saklealakaa), it must 
be a wrong notion.   
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(klia) [MSA 18.92d2].66 [It is] indeed with this [personalistic false view] as a 
cause [that] desire, etc., [which are] defiled, are produced. 
[The Pudgalavdin:] But [according to you,] should one say that the pudgala is 
one [and the same] with or rather distinct (anya) from the [real] thing (vastu) 
named “corporeity,” etc., with regard to which the [verbal] designation 
“pudgala” [takes place]? [The MSA] answers:67 This [pudgala] can be said to be 
neither one [and the same] with nor distinct from the [basis of its designation, 
i.e., from the five skandhas] [MSA 18.93ab1].68 [The Pudgalavdin:] For which 
reason? [Answer:] Because of the two faults [that would ensue] [MSA 18.93b2]. 
[The Pudgalavdin:] Because of which two faults? [Answer:] Because [if the 
66 According to MSAVBh tsi D165a3–4/P194a1–2, defilements (*klea) such as desire 
(*rga), hostility (*dvea) and error (*moha) arise from the false view of a self (*tmad	
i). 
Therefore, since the false view of a self serves as the cause of defilements, the personalistic 
false view (*satkyad	
i) is the nature of the defilements (*kleasvabhva). On the 
genealogy of the defilements out of the false view of a self, see below, MSABh 160,3–4 and 
n. 123. For similar statements in early Yogcra literature and in the Buddhist episte-
mologists’ works, see Eltschinger forthcoming 1. 
67 According to MSAVBh tsi D165a4–b2/P194a2–b1, the Pudgalavdin has objected as fol-
lows: You claim that the pudgala does not exist as a real substance (*dravyasat), but exists 
as a designation (*prajñaptisat). Now, a designation (*prajñapti) is impossible (*asam-
bhava) without a basis (g	i = *vastu), as the designation “pot” (*gha
a iti) is impossible in 
the absence of a pot, but occurs in dependence of a pot (*gha
am ritya). On which basis, 
then, does the designation “pudgala” occur? The reply to this objection is as follows: The 
designation “pudgala,” far from being based on something existing substantially, is nothing 
but a designation of the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality to which one clings 
(*pañcopdnaskandha), as it is said in the Stra: “O monks, those ascetics or Brahmins 
who consider that [there is] a self, all these only consider the five constituents-of-(pseudo-
)personality to which one clings.”* *MSAVBh tsi D165a6/P194a4–5: dge sbyo am bram 
ze ’am / ga su ya ru ba bdag gam bdag gi 	es ’dogs pa de dag ni ñe bar len pa’i phu po 
la ñid la a ’am bdag gi 	es lta 	i ’dogs par zad do 	es gsus so //. To be compared with 
AKBh 282,1–3 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:95; Koa IV.17) and AKBh 467,6–7/LE82,2–4 
(Koa V.253; see LE82n. 289 for references): ye kecid bhikava rama v brhma v 
tmeti samanupayanta samanupayanti sarve ta imn eva pañcopdnaskandhn iti /, and 
SN III.46 (XXII, 47, 3) (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:95): ye hi keci bhikkhave sama v 
brhma v anekavihita attna samanupassamn samanupassanti / sabbe te pañcu-
pdnakkhandhe samanupassanti etesa v aññatara /. The same passage is quoted in 
MAV 244,15–18 and 254,14–16. 
68 According to MSAVBh tsi D165b2–3/P194b1–3, since it exists as a mere designation 
(*prajñaptisat) but not as a real substance (*dravyasat), the pudgala can be said neither to 
be of the same nature (*ekasvabhva) as the skandhas nor to be distinct from the skandhas.  
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skandhas and the pudgala were one and the same,] the skandhas would be 
(prasaga) the self, and [if the skandhas and the pudgala were distinct,] the 
[pudgala] would be a [real] substance [MSA 18.93cd].69 For if [the skandhas 
and the pudgala] are one [and the same], it follows that the skandhas are the self, 
and that the pudgala is a [real] substance. But if [the skandhas and the pudgala] 
are distinct[, then it follows that] the pudgala exists as a [real] substance. For [it 
is] in this way [only, i.e.], since the pudgala exists as a [mere] designation, [that] 
one is justified [in saying] that it cannot be said [to be either one and the same 
with or distinct from the skandhas70]; [and] therefore, it is established as a point 
[to be left] unanswered (avyk	tavastu).71  
69 According to MSAVBh tsi D165b5–166a2/P194b6–195a3, if one holds that the skandhas 
and the pudgala are one and the same (*eka), then, (1a) as the self (*tman) is of a per-
manent nature (*nityasvabhva), the five skandhas themselves will be of a permanent nature 
(which is false). Moreover, (1b) if the five skandhas and the self were one and the same, 
then, as the the five skandhas exist as real substances (*dravyasat), the pudgala also would 
exist as a real substance (which is false). But if one holds the pudgala to exist independently 
of the five skandhas, then, (2) as the outsiders (*trthika) claim that what they call “tman” 
exists as a real substance independently of the skandhas, what is called “pudgala” will also 
exist as a real substance independently of the five skandhas (which is false). In both 
Vasubandhu’s and Sthiramati’s interpretations, (1b) = (2). For an argument similar to (1b), 
see AKBh 461,24–462,24/LE40,9–48,5, quoted below, n. 76. 
70 MSAVBh tsi D166a2–3/P195a3–5: go du bad pa ltar na ga zag rdzas su med par ‘gyur 
te / btags pa tsam du yod pas na / ga zag gi phu po da ra b	in gcig par mi (em.: DP om. 
mi) ‘gyur ro // phu po ñid ga zag gi ra b	in yin no 	es kya ma brjod la / phu po la ma 
gtogs par ga zag logs ig na yod par ya mi brjod la / don du na phu po la ya ga zag gi 
ra b	in med / phu po la ma gtogs par ga zag ces bya ba logs ig na ya rdzas su med do 
	es bya ba’i don to //. “As stated before, since the pudgala does not exist as a [real] 
substance, [but] exists as a mere designation, the pudgala cannot have the same nature as the 
skandhas. [We] don’t say that the skandhas are the nature of the pudgala, and we don’t say 
that the pudgala exists independently of the skandhas. Ultimately, the skandhas don’t have 
the nature of a pudgala, [but] the pudgala does not exist as a [real] substance independently 
of the skandhas. Such is the [intended] meaning.” 
71 According to MSAVBh tsi D166a4–6/P195a6–8, one says neither that the skandhas and the 
pudgala are one and the same thing, nor that they are distinct things. Therefore, if someone 
asks whether the skandhas and the pudgala are one and the same, one does not answer that 
they are one and the same thing (*eka ity avyk	ta). And if someone asks whether the 
skandhas and the pudgala are distinct things, one does not answer that they are distinct 
things (*bhinna ity avyk	ta). And indeed, since the pudgala is without a nature of its own 
(*nisvabhva), it can be taught neither to be the same as the skandhas nor to be distinct 
from them, as it cannot be answered that the son of a barren woman (*vandhyputra) is of 
dark (*yma) or clear (*gaura) complexion. The types of questions are traditionally held to 
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be four in number (AKBh 292,9–10): sthpanya prano ’vyk	ta ity uktam / caturvidho hi 
prana / ekavykarayo vibhajyavykaraya parip	cchyavykaraya sthpanya 
ca /. “A question that should be avoided is called ‘unanswered.’ There are indeed four types 
of questions: to be answered by absolute affirmation, to be answered by distinguishing [the 
different aspects involved], to be answered by questioning [the questioner], and to be 
avoided [, i.e., left unanswered].” (1) AKBh 292,15: ki sarvasattv marantty ekena 
vykartavya mariyantti /. “[The question:] ‘Will all living beings die?’ should be 
answered by absolute affirmation: ‘[Yes, all] will die.’” (2) AKBh 292,15–16: ki sarve 
janiyanta iti vibhajya vykartavya sakle janiyante na nikle iti /. “[The question:] 
‘Will all [living beings] be reborn?’ should be answered by distinguishing: ‘[Those] who are 
defiled will be reborn, not the undefiled [ones].’” (3) AKBh 292,16–19: ki manuyo vii
o 
hna iti parip	cchya vykartavyam / kn adhik	tya pranayasti / yadi bryd devn iti / 
hna iti vykartavyam / yadi bryd apyn iti / vii
a iti vykartavyam /. “[The question:] 
‘Is the human being superior [or] inferior?’ should be answered by questioning [the 
questioner]: ‘With regard to whom do you ask?’ If he said: ‘To the gods,’ [then] one should 
answer: ‘Inferior.’ [But] if he said: ‘To [those of] the evil states of existence,’ [then] one 
should answer: ‘Superior.’” (4) The issue of the pudgala as well as all the other avyk	ta-
vastus belongs to the fourth category (AKBh 292,19–20): kim anya skandhebhya 
sattvo ’nanya iti sthpanya / sattvadravyasybhvd vandhyputraymagauratdivat /. 
“[The question:] ‘Is the [personal] being other or the same as the skandhas?’ should be 
avoided, because there is no [such real] substance [as] a [personal] being, as [should be 
avoided the question] whether the son of a barren woman is of dark or clear complexion.” 
Other famous examples include: “Is the hair of a tortoise hard or soft?” (ki kaurmasya 
roma kharat m	dut v [AKBh 469,12/LE98,5]), or: “The fruits of the mango tree in 
your palace, are they sour or sweet? – [But, says king Milinda,] there is no mango tree in my 
palace!” (yas te ’ntapure mrav	kas tasya kim amlni phalny hosvin madhurti / 
naiva mamntapure kacid mrav	ko ’sti / [AKBh 469,20–21/LE100,3–4]). The reason 
why the Buddha remains silent on questions such as that of the identity/difference of the self 
and the skandhas is that he takes into consideration the intention of the person asking the 
question (pra
ur aypek) in order to prevent him from falling into the extremes of 
eternalism (vatnta, if he answers that they are indeed different) and annihilationism 
(ucchednta, if he answers that they are the same), i.e., in false views (d	
i) and ethical 
nihilism (the view that there is no good or bad action and no eschatological consequence), 
the latter being generally held to be more perverse than the former. On the ten or fourteen 
avyk	tavastus, see AKBh 292,8–294,4 and Koa IV.43–48, Traité I.153–161 and 423; for 
other references, see May 1959:277–278n. 1015. In the specific context of the present 
polemic, see especially AKBh 469,9–471,19/LE98,1–114,3 (Koa V.262–270), MAV 
250,16–252,2 and Venkata Ramanan 1953:168 and 175–176. 
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72But to those who, violating the Teacher’s Teaching, admit that the pudgala 
exists as a [real] substance,73 one should reply as follows: If [your pudgala] 
exists as a [real] substance and [at the same time] cannot be said [to be either 
one and the same with or distinct from the skandhas, then you] have to state the 
reason (prayojana) [for this] [MSA 18.94ab]. 74  [The Pudgalavdin:] Why 
[should we state such a reason]? [Answer:] [Because a real pudgala] cannot be 
said to be neither one [and the same with] nor distinct [from the skandhas] 
without a reason [being provided for the denial of each of the two propositions] 
[MSA 18.94cd].75  
But if [, in the absence of any reason,] it were merely due to an example that 
they accepted that the pudgala cannot be said [to be either one and the same with 
or distinct from the skandhas, stating:] “As fire can be said to be neither distinct 
72 According to MSAVBh tsi D166a6–7/P195a8–b2, MSABh 155,19–156,8 has been cri-
ticizing in a general way (*smnyena) both the *tmavdin outsiders (*trthika) and the 
*bauddhas who believe in the existence of the pudgala. In MSABh 156,8–24 (see below, n. 
83) onwards, the MSABh starts to criticize the Buddhist coreligionists (bstan pa ‘di la 	ugs 
pa), more precisely the views of the Smityas (sam [P: D sa] bi ti pa) who admit that 
the pudgala exists as a real substance. See above, n. 8. 
73 According to MSAVBh tsi D166a7–b2/P195b2–5, “those who” refers to the Smityas 
(sam [P: D sa] bi ti pa); “Teacher” refers to the Blessed Buddha (*bhagavn buddha); 
“Teaching” refers to the twelve-membered word of the Buddha (*dvdagapravacana), 
i.e., to the doctrine according to which all factors are impermanent (*anitya), painful 
(*dukha), empty (*nya), and selfless (*antman). To “violate” this teaching is tanta-
mount to expounding its meaning (*artha) erroneously by saying that what is called “pud-
gala” exists as a real substance (*dravyasat), that it can be said neither to be one and the 
same with (*eka) nor distinct from (*bhinna) the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality 
(*pañcaskandha). 
74 According to MSAVBh tsi D166b2–5/P195b5–196a1, the proponent has stated the reasons 
(*prayojana = *hetu; in MSABh 156,4–7) why he says neither that the pudgala is one and 
the same with the skandhas (for if it were the case, the skandhas would be permanent and 
the pudgala would exist as a real substance) nor that it is distinct from them (for if it were 
the case, the pudgala would exist as a real substance as the *tman postulated by the out-
siders [*trthikaparikalpita]). In the same way, the Pudgalavdin should state the reasons 
why his substantially existing pudgala cannot be said (*avcya) to be either one and the 
same with or distinct from the skandhas. 
75 According to MSAVBh tsi D166b7–167a2/P196a4–6, if they cannot be said to be one and 
the same (*eka) thing, then they must be distinct (*bhinna) things, like fire and water, and if 
they cannot be said to be distinct things, then they must be one and the same, like fire and 
fire’s heat (*agnyauya). 
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from nor the same as the fuel (indhana),”76 one should reply to them as follows: 
Because of [their distinct] characteristics, because of [that which is] observed in 
the [ordinary] world and because of the [authoritative] treatises [that speak to 
the contrary], it is not correct [to affirm] that fuel and fire cannot be said [MSA 
18.95ac] to be either one [and the same] or distinct [from one another]. For what 
we call “fire” is [nothing but] the element fire (tejodhtu), [whereas] the fuel 
[consists of] the remaining [three] elements [i.e., earth, water and wind]. Now 
since their characteristics are distinct, fire is simply other than fuel.77 And since 
76 According to MSAVBh tsi D167a2–b1/P196a7–b6, the Pudgalavdin adduces an example 
of something that exists as a real substance but cannot be said to be either one and the same 
with or distinct from another. Fire (*agni) and fuel (*indhana) exist as real substances 
(*dravyasat) but are not distinct things, for once fire has arisen from fuel, they are no longer 
distinct things; and if they were distinct things, fire could arise even in the absence of fuel; 
but since one doesn’t observe that fire arises in the absence of fuel, they are not distinct 
things. Nor are fire and fuel one and the same thing, for fuel is the cause of fire and does not 
have heat for its nature (*uatsvabhva), whereas fire is the effect of fuel and has heat for 
its nature; and if they were one and the same thing, then, as one would not burn oneself 
when touching ([sam]sp	-) fire, one would burn oneself when touching fuel. On the 
example of fuel and fire, see AKBh 461,24–462,24/LE40,9–48,5 (Koa V.234–237), and 
especially AKBh 462,1–4/LE42,2–6: na hi vinendhanengni prajñapyate / na cnya indha-
nd agni akyate pratijñtum / npy ananya / yadi hy anya syd anuam indhana syt 
/ athnanya syd dhyam eva dhaka syt / eva na ca vin skandhai pudgala pra-
jñapyate / na cnya skandhebhya akyate pratijñtu vataprasagt / npy ananya 
ucchedaprasagd iti /. Note AKVy 700,7–8: vataprasagd ity asask	tavat / 
ucchedaprasagd iti skandhavat /. See also above, n. 69. That the(/certain) Pudgalavdins 
made use of this analogy is made almost certain by a passage of the S (466b3–6, trans-
lation Chau 1987:35 [see also Venkata Ramanan 1953:182]): “Qu’est-ce que le pudgala-
désigné-par-les-fondements? – Comme le Bouddha l’a dit à Ppaka: ‘En se fondant sur 
telles et telles choses composées (saskra), on nomme [pudgala] ce-qui-est-désigné-par-
les-fondements.’ Ce qui est nommé [pudgala]-désigné-par-les-fondements, est comme le feu 
[par rapport au combustible].” On the *rayaprajñaptapudgala, see 1. Buddhist 
Personalism and its Critique, 1.4. On the fire-fuel analogy, see Duerlinger 1982. 
77 According to MSAVBh tsi D167b5–6/P197a3–5, among the four great elements (*mah-
bhta), fire is the element fire (*tejodhtu) and has heat for its characteristic (*uat-
lakaa); as for fuel, it consists of the remaining three elements, viz. earth (*p	thivdhtu), 
water (*abdhtu) and wind (*vyudhtu), which have respectively for their characteristics 
solidity (*kharalakaa), fluidity (*snehalakaa) and mobility (*ralakaa). See AK 
1.12cd, AKBh 8,18–25, and Koa I.22–23. To be compared with AKBh 462,12–14/ 
LE44,11–13 (Koa V.235): atha punas tatraiva k
hdau pradpte yad auya tad agnis 
tatsahajtni bhtnndhanam iyante / tayor api siddham anyatva lakaabhedt /, and 
AKVy 700,21–24 thereon: tayor apy agnndhanayor evalakaayo siddham anyatva 
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in the world [of ordinary experience], one observes [the existence of] fuel such 
as wood even in the absence of fire, and [of] fire even in the absence of fuel, 
[their] being other is [well] established. 78  Moreover, in the [authoritative] 
treatises (stre) [preached by Him], the Blessed One has said nowhere that fire 
and fuel cannot be said [to be either one and the same or distinct].79 Therefore, 
this is incorrect. [The Pudgalavdin:] But how is it known that fire [also] exists 
without fuel? [Answer:] Because one perceives [that fire can exist without fuel] 
[MSA 18.95d1],80 for [when it is] blown by the wind, [fire can] even go a long 
way while [still] ablaze. [The Pudgalavdin:] But in this case, the wind [itself] 
might [well] be the fuel! [Answer:] This is precisely the reason why it is establi-
shed that fire and fuel are [mutually] distinct [things]!81 [The Pudgalavdin: But] 
why? [Answer:] As [being] two, indeed [MSA 18.95d2].82 [This] is to be con-
strued with “Because one perceives.” [And] indeed, here two [things] are 
perceived, [i.e.,] the flame and, as [its] fuel, the wind. 
________________________________ 
lakaabhedt / p	thivdhtvdn lakanyatvt / bhinnalakan hy anyatva 
d	
a rpavedandnm /. 
78 On the existence of fire in the absence of fuel, see below, MSABh 156,20–21. 
79 According to MSAVBh tsi D168a2–4/P196b2–4, in the Abhidharma (mon pa’i chos ‘bum 
gyi g	u = *Abhidharmaatashasrikagrantha?), the Blessed One has not said that fire and 
fuel are one and the same thing, but that they are distinct things, for he has said: “Fire has 
heat for its nature (*uatsvabhva), earth has solidity for its nature (*kharasvabhva), 
water has fluidity for its nature (*snehasvabhva), and wind has mobility for its nature 
(*rasvabhva).”  
80 According to MSAVBh tsi D167b2–4/P196b7–197a3, upalabdhe adduces a fourth reason 
proving that fire and fuel are distinct things. According to Sthiramati, upalabdhi is to be 
understood as *upalabdhiprama.  
81 According to MSAVBh tsi D168b1–2/P198a2–3, since the wind performs the action 
(*karman) of bringing the flame (*jvl) somewhere else (*anyadea), it has mobility for its 
nature (*rasvabhva); but since the flame has heat for its nature (*uatsvabhva), 
wind and fire are established as mutually distinct things.  
82 Like Vasubandhu, Sthiramati (MSAVBh tsi D168b2–3/P198a3–5) seems to interpret 
dvayena hi as a fifth reason in favour of the difference between fire and fuel, for “dvayena hi 
occurs in the stanza, but not the word upalabhe” (k ri k las gñis su 	es ’byu gi / dmigs 
pa 	es bya ba ni tshig mi ’byu mod kyi, MSAVBh tsi D168b2–3/P198a4). When the flame 
is blown by the wind, one perceives them as being two: the wind is perceived as having 
mobility/motion for its characteristic, whereas the flame is perceived as having heat for its 
characteristics.  
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[The Pudgalavdin:] The pudgala, which is the seer, [and this] up to the cogni-
zer, the agent, the experiencer, the knower and the liberator, does simply exist.83 
[Answer:] The [pudgala] is no more justified as [being] a seer than it is [as the 
agent of any action,] up to [being] a liberator. [And] indeed, it could be the agent 
of the cognitions called “seeing,” etc., either as [their causal] condition or as 
[their] master.84 Among these [two, let us consider] first [the hypothesis of the 
pudgala as a causal condition]: Since a cognition arises in dependence of two 
[factors only], the [pudgala] is not [its causal] condition [MSA 18.96ab].85 [The 
83 According to MSAVBh tsi D168b4–7/P198a5–b2, the false view (*d	
i) of the Smityas 
(sam [P: D sa] bi ti pa) has been duly refuted (in MSABh 156,8–24, see above, n. 72) so 
that the MSABh 156,24ff. can turn to the refutation of those outsiders (*trthika) who hold 
that the self (?a'i bdag, “the self that is the I/ego”) exists. According to them, the self is the 
agent (*-kra) of the action (*kriy) of seeing visible things (*rpa), etc., up to cognizing 
mental events (*dharma); it experiences (*anubh) the pleasurable (*sukha) and painful 
(*dukha) results (*krya) of good and bad deeds (*kualkualakarman) that are respon-
sible for one’s entanglement in sasra; the bondage (’chi ba = bandhana, sayojana?) 
that ties living beings (*sattva) amounts to three factors: *sattva, *rajas, and *tamas; once it 
has liberated itself from this threefold bondage, the self liberates itself (*moka), obtains 
nirva. Considering that Sthiramati refers here at least inter alia to Skhya doctrines, 
Tib. ’chi ba may render an original Skt. bandha (see Frauwallner 1953:338); pre-classical 
Skhya knew of a threefold bondage: prak	tibandha (bondage through Urmaterie) vai-
krikabandha (bondage through emotions), and dakibandha (bondage through the 
sacrificial fee; see Frauwallner 1953:337–339). In the doctrine alluded to by Sthiramati, the 
three basic  constituents of matter have been substituted for the older three factors, so that 
one may interpret this threefold bondage as the soul’s entanglement in matter and its pro-
cesses (see Frauwallner 1953:374–380). As suggested above (see 1. Buddhist Personalism 
and its Critique, 1.4 and n. 18), there is no compelling reason to follow Sthiramati’s opinion 
that the MSA(Bh) is now attacking non-Buddhist doctrines. 
84 According to MSAVBh tsi D168b7–169a5/P198b3–199a1, the self could be an agent in the 
sense of a master (*svmin): In the same way as a master or a lord (dpon po = pati?) 
commands (*va-) the slave (*dsa) and has his wishes fulfilled by the slave due to his 
command (*vaa), the self might be in command of cognitions such as the visual cognition 
(*cakurvijñndivijñna); due to the power of the self, the cognitions (*vijñna) would see 
visible things, etc. (*rpdi), and the self in turn would see (*d	-) or experience 
(*anubh-) visible things as they appear in the cognition (*yath vijñne [prati]bhsate). 
85 According to MSAVBh tsi D169a5–6/P199a1–3, a visual cognition (*cakurvijñna) arises 
in dependence of something visible (*rpa) and the visual sense-faculty (*cakurindriya). 
Therefore, what is called the self cannot act as a causal condition in the rise of a visual 
cognition. To be compared with AKBh 464,12–14/LE 60,6–9 (Koa V.241): stre hi 
nirdhritam / dvaya prattya vijñnasyotpdo bhavatti* / tath cakur bhiko het rpi 
pratyaya cakurvijñnasyotpdya / tat kasya heto / yat kicid bhiko cakurvijñna 
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Pudgalavdin:] For which reason [isn’t the pudgala a causal condition in the 
production of a cognition]? [Answer:] Because [it is] useless [MSA 18.96c1], for 
one does not observe it to have any function (smarthya) in this [process].86 Or, 
if [the pudgala] presided over [the rise of a cognition], neither would it bring 
about an impermanent [pleasurable cognition, nor would it ever bring about] an 
undesirable one [MSA 18.97ab].87 Indeed, if this [pudgala] presided over the 
production of cognitions, it would [certainly] not bring about a desirable [but] 
impermanent cognition, and certainly no undesirable one. Therefore, since it is 
impossible in either of the two ways (ubhayathpi) [i.e., either as a causal con-
dition or as a master], the [pudgala] cannot be a seer, [and this] up to a liberator 
[MSA 18.96c2d]. 
Furthermore, if the pudgala exists as a [real] substance, its operation and cha-
racteristic are to be established [MSA 18.97a].88 [And indeed,] one perceives 
________________________________ 
sarva tac caku prattya rpi ceti** /. *T 2, 54a23, SN IV.67 (XXXV, 93, 2) according 
to LE60n. 124; **T 2, 57c18 according to LE60n. 125. 
86 According to MSAVBh tsi D169a5–6/P199a1–3, when fire has been brought about by the 
fuel, water is in no way (*na kathacit) necessary in order to produce it; in the same way, 
when a visual cognition has arisen in dependence of something visible (*rpa) and the eye 
(*cakus), the self is in no way necessary in order to produce it. In other words, the self is 
useless (*nirartha), does not perform any action (*akicitkara). 
87 According to MSAVBh tsi D169b2–5/P199a6–b3, if the self experienced visible or audible 
things as they appear in cognition, then, since the living beings (*sattva) always (*nityam) 
long for pleasure (*sukha) alone and wish never to be associated with suffering (*dukha), 
the self would always produce pleasurable cognitions, and never undesirable (*ani
a) and 
unpleasurable (*asukha) ones. For if the self were in command of cognitions and expe-
rienced pleasure and suffering as they appear in the various cognitions, it would always 
bring about pleasurable cognitions and never painful ones. To be compared with Traité 
II.743: “Si l’	tman était autonome (svatantra) et actif (kraka), il devrait tout obtenir selon 
ses désirs. Or il n’obtient pas [toujours] ce qu’il désire, et il subit [souvent] ce qu’il ne désire 
pas. […] En outre, tout être déteste la douleur (dukha) ; mais quiconque recherche le 
bonheur (sukha), trouve la douleur. C’est pourquoi, nous savons que l’	tman n’est pas 
autonome, ni non plus actif.” 
88 According to MSAVBh tsi D169b7–170a2/P199b6–200a1, the visual sense-faculty 
(*cakurindriya) and the visual cognition (*cakurvijñna), which exist as real substances 
(*dravyasat), possess an operation (*karman) and a characteristic (*lakaa): their joint 
operation is to perform the action of seeing visible things; the characteristic of the visual 
sense-faculty is to manifest something visible (*rpaprasda); the characteristic of the 
visual cognition is (*-svabhva) to cognize a colour such as blue (*nldirpa). If one 
accepts that what is called the self also exists as a real substance, one has to exhibit its 
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[both] the operation and the characteristic of [all] that which exists as a [real] 
substance. For example, [one perceives that] vision, etc., and the manifestation 
of visible [things], etc., [are respectively the operation and the characteristic] of 
the eye, etc.89 But it is not so in the case of the pudgala. Therefore, it does not 
exist as a [real] substance. And if one accepts this [pudgala] as a [real] sub-
stance, [then] the Blessed One’s threefold complete awakening gets ruined 
[MSA 18.97b],90 [viz.] the complete awakening [that is extremely] profound, the 
complete awakening [that is] uncommon, and the complete awakening [that is] 
supra-mundane.91 Indeed, if [it is] the pudgala [that he] perfectly understands, 
________________________________ 
operation and its characteristic, for in their absence, the self is simply similar to a rabbit’s 
horn (*aavia) and to the son of a barren woman (*vandhyputra). On the rabbit’s horn, 
see Traité II.738 and Venkata Ramanan 1953:193. 
89 Translated from the Tibetan version (MSABhtib P262b3): ga 	ig rdzas su yod pa de’i ni las 
da mtshan ñid kya dmigs te / dper na mig la sogs pa’i lta ba la sogs pa da gzugs dad pa 
la sogs pa lta bu yin na /. Here is the text as edited by Lévi (L157,10–11), with the variant 
readings of MSS A (156a6–b1) and B (142b2–4) in brackets: yadi dravyato ’sti tasya 
karmpy upalabhyate (upalabhyeta MS A, upalabhyet [sic] MS B)/ yath cakurdn 
darandilakaa ca rpaprasddi (MS A om. lakaa ca rpaprasddi) /. The 
reading of the Tibetan version can be reconstructed as follows: *yad dravyato ’sti tasya kar-
malakaam apy upalabhyate / yath cakurdn darandi rpaprasddi (ca) /. Such a 
reading is perfectly consonant with Sthiramati’s commentary (see above, n. 88), which 
reflects a dvandva analysis of °karmalakaam. 
90 According to MSAVBh tsi D170a4–7/P200a3–7, this argument relies on S (s lu lja pa’i 
mdo) 30,16–19 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:96–97 as well as Schoening 1995:I.237–239 and 
II.395). MSAVBh tsi D170a4–5/P200a4–5: de la sas rgyas bcom ldan ‘das ga 	e na / ga 
gis chos thams cad thugs su chud pa’i phyir / sas rgyas 	es bya ste / des (em.: P des da, D 
de da) ’phags pa’i chos kyi sku da es rab kyi spyan gyis bya chub byed pa da slob pa 
da mi slob pa’i (em.: DP pas) chos gzigs so //. “Among these [things], what does a Blessed 
Buddha consist of? We call ‘Buddha’ the one who, because he comprehends (*avabodha) 
all dharmas, sees the [three] dharmas of that which enlightens, of those [still] undergoing 
training (*aika) and of those no [longer] in need of training through the noble dharma-
body and the eye of insight (*prajñcakus).” According to Sthiramati, a Buddha is called 
‘Buddha’ because he correctly comprehends the meaning of all dharmas as many as there 
are (*yvadbhvika). If the pudgala existed, this omniscient (*sarvajña) being would see it; 
but if he saw the pudgala, he could no longer be called a ‘Buddha’ due to comprehending 
this threefold salvational dharma.   
91 According to MSAVBh tsi D170a7–b5/P200a8–b6, his complete awakening is termed 
“profound” due to the fact that he comprehends the *dharmanairtmya (a feature that tradi-
tionally distinguishes him from the Arhats, rvakas and Pratyekabuddhas), “uncommon” 
due to the fact that he comprehends the *pudgalanairtmya (a feature that traditionally 
distinguishes him from the tmavdin outsiders), and “supra-mundane” due to the fact that 
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[then] nothing profound [at all] is perfectly understood [by him], and [nothing] 
that is not common to the outsiders, and nothing [that is] unusual (anucita) in the 
ordinary world (loka), for such a grasping is accessible to all ordinary people 
(loka), adhered to by the outsiders, and adapted to/usual in (ucita) the long 
sasra.  
Moreover, the pudgala, if it is [an agent such as] a seer, [and this] up to a 
cognizer, might either entail exertion or lack exertion in order to see, etc.92 Now 
if it belongs to a [pudgala] that entails exertion, this exertion might either be 
self-arisen, [i.e.,] spontaneous, or have this [pudgala] as its [causal] condition. 
But its effort in order to see, etc., is not self-arisen, because of all the three 
[faults that are to be presented below] [MSA 18.98ab]. And it is precisely 
because of the three faults that will be presented [below] that [we reject the 
second hypothesis also, i.e., the pudgala’s] being the [causal] condition of this 
effort [MSA 18.98c]. 93  [Here in MSA 18.98d, the negation] “na” is to be 
supplied. Now if [the pudgala] is lacking exertion, [then] it is established [that 
this pudgala is not an agent. And indeed: if] seeing, etc., lacks an effort [MSA 
18.98d], i.e., if there is no exertion [on the part] of the pudgala in order to see, 
etc., how [can] this [pudgala] be [an agent such as] a seer, [and this] up to a 
cognizer? 
[The Pudgalavdin:] It has been stated [above]: “Because of three faults.” [But] 
because of which three faults? [Answer:] Because the [pudgala] would no 
[longer] be an agent, because [the exertion] is impermanent, [and] because [exer-
________________________________ 
he comprehends both the *dharma- and the *pudgalanairtmya (a feature that traditionally 
distinguishes him from worldly or ordinary persons [*laukika, but also *p	thagjana in 
MSAVBh tsi D171a1/P201a3]). Alternatively, his complete awakening is termed “pro-
found” because he knows that the *parikalpitasvabhva does not exist, “uncommon” be-
cause he comprehends the *paratantra (which is devoid of *parikalpitadharmas and *pari-
kalpitapudgala), i.e., that the mind and the mental factors (*cittacaitta) simply exist (yod pa 
tsam), and “supra-mundane” because he comprehends the *parinipannalakaa. 
92 According to MSAVBh tsi D171a3–4/P201a5–7, “exertion” (*prayatna) refers to one’s 
opening (*unmea, *unmlana) one’s eyes, etc.  
93 At least as far as the soundness of the argument is concerned, MSABh 157,22 tad° cannot be 
taken to refer to pudgala, an interpretation shared by the Tibetan translations (MSABhtib 
P262b8 and MSAVBh tsi D171a7/P201b3: byed pa de’i rkyen [canMSABhtib]). Moreover (and 
contrary to MSABh 157,19: tatpratyaya), the compound tadyatnapratyaya- is better not 
interpreted as a bahuvrhi. 
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tion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this pudgala’s] effort in order 
to see [visible things], etc., cannot be self-arisen [MSA 18.99]. If the exertion 
[made] in order to see [visible things], etc., [and] through which seeing, etc., 
[occurs,] is spontaneous [i.e., without cause nor condition], then the pudgala is 
not the agent of these [cognitions]; therefore, how [can] this pudgala be [an 
agent such as] a seer, [and this] up to a cognizer? Or, if it is spontaneous, [then,] 
since it does not depend [on any cause or condition, this] exertion would not 
occasionally fail to occur, would not be impermanent.94 And if this effort were 
permanent, [then] seeing, etc., would occur both [all] at once and permanently.95 
Such is the [threefold] fault [alluded to above]. Therefore, the exertion [made] in 
order to see [visible things], etc., cannot be spontaneous. 
Neither a [pudgala] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [pudgala] can 
be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and 
this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before [, hence 
cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this pudgala] would [ipso facto] 
be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of 
a pudgala that would be neither permanent nor impermanent] [MSA 18.100].96 
94 According to MSAVBh tsi D172a4–5/P202b2–4, since that which depends on a cause 
(*kraam apekate) arises when its cause is present and does not arise when its cause is 
absent, it can be lacking sometimes; on the contrary, causeless (*nirhetuka) dharmas, since 
they do not depend on causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya), can never be lacking at a 
certain point in time. Therefore, if it is spontaneous (*kasmika), the effort made in order to 
see something visible, etc., should not be impermanent, i.e., should be characterized as 
permanent (*nityalakaa). 
95 According to MSAVBh tsi D172a5–b1/P202b4–7, impermanent dharmas do not arise all at 
once (*sak	t); some arise and some do not arise; sometimes they arise and sometimes not. 
On the contrary, permanent dharmas occur entirely (thog thag tu khyab par), like space 
(*kavat), and all the time (*sarvad).  
96 According to MSAVBh tsi D172b1–7/P202b8–203b1, if the self serves as a causal condition 
(*pratyaya), then this causal condition could be either permanent or impermanent according 
to whether the self is permanent or impermanent. (1) Since the effects arisen from perma-
nent causes cannot be occasional but occur permanently, the action of seeing should occur 
when the eyes actually see (or: when the eyes are opened, *cakurunmeakle), but also 
already before, when they do not see yet (or: when the eyes are shut, *cakurnimeakle; see 
also MSAVBh tsi D172b7–173a3/P203b1–3). (2) Since the self must be impermanent if the 
exertion is impermanent, the opponent’s claim that the self is permanent is useless (see also 
MSAVBh tsi D173a6–7/P203b7–204a1). (3) There can be no third hypothesis according to 
which the self would be neither permanent nor impermanent because, since “permanent” 
and “impermanent” are contradictory properties (*viruddhadharma), that which is perma-
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But if the exertion [made in order to see something visible, etc.,] had the 
pudgala for its [causal] condition, [then] this [pudgala, if it always] remains as it 
is, cannot be the [causal] condition [of this exertion], because [this exertion] 
does not exist before [the wish to open one’s eyes and see]. For if [this effort] 
had the [pudgala] for its [causal] condition, [then,] since the pudgala is never 
without existing, why would [this] exertion lack before, [i.e.,] when it has not 
[yet] arisen? [But] a perishable [pudgala] cannot be the condition [of exertion] 
either, for it would follow that the pudgala is impermanent. And there [can] be 
no third hypothesis according to which it could be neither enduring nor 
perishable. [Therefore,] the effort cannot have this [pudgala] for its condition 
either. 
So far (eva tvat), [it is] by resorting to reason(ing) [alone that it has been 
demonstrated that] the pudgala does not exist (nopalabhyate) as a [real] 
substance.97 And [this can also be demonstrated by resorting to scripture,] be-
cause [the Blessed One has] taught [that] all dharmas are selfless, [that] ulti-
mately [there is nothing but] emptiness, and [that] to perceive a self is harmful 
(tmopalambhe doa
) [MSA 18.101]. Indeed, in the [four] summary statements 
of doctrine,98 the Blessed One has taught that all dharmas are selfless. [And] in 
the [Stra entitled] Paramrthanyat,99 [the Blessed One has] taught that the 
act100 [really] exists, that the [result of its] maturation101 [also] exists, but that 
________________________________ 
nent is not impermanent, and that which is impermanent is not permanent: for one single 
dharma (or: entity, *vastu) cannot be determined (*vyavasthita) as being neither permanent 
nor impermanent. Moreover, if it is not permanent, then it is impermanent (or: one adopts 
the thesis of impermanence, *anityapakapta), and the first of the above-mentioned faults 
(see [1]) will ensue; if it is not impermanent, then it is permanent (or: one adopts the thesis 
of permanence, *nityapakapta), and the second of the above-mentioned faults (see [2]) 
will ensue (see also MSAVBh tsi D173a6–7/P203b7–204a1).  
97 According to MSAVBh tsi D173b2/P204a4–5, reason(ing) (*yukti) consists of arguments 
made on the basis of perception (*pratyakaprama) and inference (*anumnaprama). 
In MSABh 158,16ff., our text turns to prove that the pudgala does not exist as a real 
substance by means of scripture (*gamaprama).  
98 On the four dharmoddnas, see MSAVBh tsi D173b3–4/P204a6–7 and 2. The Immediate 
Context of MSA(Bh) 18.92–103, 2.2.  
99 According to MSAVBh tsi D173b4/P204a7, in the Stra of the rvakas entitled Para-
mrthanya(t). See LE92n. 355, which refers to T. 2, 92c18, and the passage quoted in 
Koa V.259–260n. 5. See below, n. 102. 
100 According to MSAVBh tsi D173b7/P204b3, the good (*kuala) and bad (*akuala) acts 
(*karman) one has done. 
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there is no (nopalabhyate) agent who [would] leave these skandhas [at death] 
and take up other skandhas [at rebirth] except a convention[al designation] for 
the [dependently originated] dharmas.102 [And] in the Pañcakas,103 [the Blessed 
________________________________ 
101 According to MSAVBh tsi D173b7/P204b3, the pleasurable (*sukha) and painful (*dukha) 
result (*phala) one experiences (*anubhta).  
102 According to MSAVBh tsi D173b7–174a2/P204b3–5, dharmasaketa (rendered chos su 
brdar btags pa in MSABhtib P263b1–2, but chos kyi tha sñad in MSAVBh tsi D173b7/ 
P204b3 and D174a1/P204b4) refers to (re)birth in sasra according to the twelve-mem-
bered scheme/principle (*dvdaganaya) of dependent origination (*prattyasamutpda), 
i.e, “with nescience for their condition (*avidypratyaya) arise the karmic forces (*sa-
skra),” etc., up to “with rebirth as their condition (*jtipratyaya) arise old age and death 
(jarmaraa),” etc. Outside/except for this twelvefold scheme/principle, there is nothing 
[…]. The same passage is quoted in AKBh 129,9–12 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:98, AKVy 
707,13–16, Koa V.259–260) and AKBh 468,24–26/LE92,8–10, with no variant reading, 
but with a very useful remark to the effect that, according to Vasubandhu, dharmasaketa 
amounts to nothing but dependent origination: asti karmsti vipka krakas tu nopala-
bhyate ya im ca skandhn nikipaty any ca skandhn pratisandadhty anyatra 
dharmasakett / tatrya dharmasaketo yad utsmin satda bhavatti vistarea 
prattyasamutpda / (Note that Yaomitra explains imn by aihikn, “this-worldly,” and 
anyn by pratrikn, “other-worldly”). The equivalence between dharmasaketa and the 
prattyasamutpda is strengthened by Yaomitra’s comments: saket hetuphalasamban-
dhavyavasth (AKVy 283,7), and dharmasaketd iti prattyasamutpdalaka[t] 
(AKVy 707,16). So according to Sthiramati, saketa 
 naya (scheme, principle, method, 
behaviour); according to Yaomitra, saketa 
 (hetuphalasambandha)vyavasth (law, rule, 
status, condition) and saketa 
 lakaa (token, attribute, characteristic; the particle iti 
makes it difficult to understand prattyasamutpdalakat as a bahuvrhi compound). 
Should we, then, understand dharmasaketa as the “convention(al designation) for the 
(dependently originated) dharmas” (as Paramrtha seems to do, see Koa V.260n. 3), as the 
“(causal) law (governing) the dharmas,” or simply as “causal origination of dharmas” (as 
does de La Vallée Poussin, see Koa V.260)? See the passage of the Chinese Sayuktgama 
quoted in Koa V.259–260n. 5 and de La Vallée Poussin’s comments on dharmasaketa in 
Koa V.260n. 3. Candrakrti quotes a small part of the same passage in MAV 262,1. 
103 Both Sthiramati (MSAVBh tsi D173b5–7/P204a8–b2: ñan thos kyi g	u gcig las brtsams pa 
da / lu ri po 	es bya ba la sogs pa g	u ma du yod pa las lu ri po’i g	u gi na nas 
chos gcig las brtsams pa da / gñis las brtsams pa da / gsum las brtsams pa da / b	i las 
brtsams pa da / la las brtsams pa’i char gyi na nas (P: D las) la las las brtsams pa’i 
la phrugs bad pa’i skabs su / ga gi phyir bdag tu bltas (D: P ltas) na ñes pa rnam pa la 
‘byu o 	es gsus te / de bas na ga zag rdzas su yod pa ma yin no //) and Vairocanarakita 
(MS 42b4: ekottarikgame pañcapañcadharmdhikrea nirdea k	ta) refer to the Eko-
ttarikgama, but the passage seems to have resisted all attempts at identification so far. As 
pointed out by La Vallée Poussin (Koa V.250–251n. 3), however, the passage presents a 
striking phraseological similarity with AN III.246 (CC, 5, and passim, Pañcakanipta 
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One has] taught that there are five evils in the perception of a self. [First,] the 
[false] view of a self [and] the [false] view of a soul (jva) arise.104 [Second, he 
who indulges in the perception of an tman] is not different from the [sub-
stantialist] outsiders. [Third, he] engages himself in a wrong path.105 [Fourth,] 
his mind does not penetrate106 into emptiness, has no faith [in it], is not intent 
[upon it], is not convinced [of it].107 [Fifth,] he does not purify his noble fac-
tors.108 From scripture also it is thus incorrect [to claim that the pudgala exists as 
a real substance].  
________________________________ 
Section, to be compared with DN III.240 [XXXIII, 2, 1] and SN III.133 [XXII, 90, 5]): 
citta na pakkhandati na ppasdati na santi

hati na vimuccati. The same passage is quoted 
in AKBh 466,14–17/LE76,6–9 (see AKVy 704,32–705,2; Koa V.250–251n. 4) with only a 
few variants: tmad	
ir bhavati sattvad	
ir jvad	
i ca for tmad	
ir bhavati jvad	
i; 
trthikai srdham for trthikai; na vimucyate for ndhimucyate (note, however, that AKVy 
705,1 also reads ndhimucyate). Interestingly enough, the Vtsputrya/Smatya of AKBh 
466,17–24/LE78,1–12 (Koa V.251–252) does not accept this locus as a scriptural authority 
(prama) on the grounds that “this [passage, grantha] is not read(/recited) in our sect” 
(nsmkam aya nikye pa
hyate), that “it is not the word of the Buddha” (na hi kilaitad 
buddhavacanam), and that “it is not the word of the Buddha because we don’t read(/recite) 
it” (so ’smbhir ap
hn na buddhavacanam). 
104 According to MSAVBh tsi D174a2/P204b5–6, if one accepts that the pudgala exists as a 
real substance (*dravyasat), one will develop the false view of a self and a soul regarding 
the skandhas that are in themselves devoid of self (*tman) and one’s own (*tmya, or: 
“what belongs to the self”).  
105 According to MSAVBh tsi D174a4–5/P204b8–205a1, the right path is the one that leads to 
nirva and liberation (*moka) by means of the mental cultivation (*bhvan) of the fact 
that all conditioned factors (*saskra) are impermanent (*anitya), painful (*dukha), 
empty (*nya), and selfless (*antman). As for the wrong path, it is that of rebirth in sa-
sra and the evil states of existence (*apya). On pratipanna, see BHSD s.v. pratipanna. 
106 On praskand (Tib. ’jug pa in MSABhtib P263b3 and MSAVBh tsi D174a5–6/P205a2–3), 
see BHSD s.v. praskanda. 
107 According to MSAVBh tsi D174a5–7/P205a2–4, nyat is here to be understood as the 
absence of self and one’s own (*tmtmya). According to Sthiramati, na prasdati na 
sati
hate ndhimucyate provides an explanation of na praskandati: “has no faith [in it]” 
refers to the time of listening (*rutakla, i.e., the rutamay prajñ), “is not intent [upon 
it]” refers to the time of (rational) reflection (*cintkla, i.e., the cintmay prajñ), and “is 
not convinced [of it]” refers to the time of mental cultivation (*bhvankla, i.e., the 
bhvanmay prajñ). On prasda and adhimoka/adhimukti, see Schmithausen 1969:179–
181nn. 263–264 and BHSD s.v. prasda and adhimukti. 
108 According to MSAVBh tsi D174a7–b1/P205a5–6, since he does not rid himself of the 
defilements (*klea) that are to be abandoned by (the path of) vision (*daranaheya) and by 
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[The Pudgalavdin:] But (hi) the pudgala has also been taught by the Blessed 
One in such and such [Stras] through the classification of [various sorts of] 
pudgalas such as the one who knows thoroughly (parijñtvin), the burden-
bearer (bhrahra) and the one who follows faith (raddhnusrin). Therefore, 
if [the pudgala] does not exist as a [real] substance, why [has it been] taught [by 
the Blessed One]?109 [Answer:] Because by [resorting to the designation of] 
pudgala, one [can, as did the Blessed One,] indicate differences in addiction and 
[mental] series concerning defilement and purification, which vary [each] ac-
cording to degree and party [MSA 18.102].110 For in the absence of a designa-
tion [such as that] of “pudgala,” one couldn’t, with regard to impurity and 
purification, [both of] which differ according to degree and party, point to the 
differences in the addiction to them as well as to the differences in the [mental] 
________________________________ 
(the path of) cultivation (*bhvanheya) and hence fails to directly realize (*sktprpti) 
nirva, he does not purify his noble factors.  
109 MSAVBh tsi D174b2–4/P205a7–b2 also mentions the dharmnusripudgala. On the form 
parijñtvin, see BHSG §22.51; on raddhnusrin, dharmnusrin and the classification 
(vyavasthna, AKBh 353,12) of other types of pudgalas in whose mental series the noble 
path has arisen (utpannryamrga), see AK 6.29ab and AKBh 353,12–18. See also above, 
n. 53. 
110 According to MSAVBh tsi D174b4–175b1/P205b2–206a8, if the name (*nma) and the 
conventional expression (*vyavahra) of “pudgala” were not available, the differences per-
taining to saklea, vyavadna, avasth, cheda, v	tti and santna could not be indicated. 
The one who is endowed with dharmas belonging to pollution (*sakleadharma) will be 
called “a pudgala endowed with pollution” (*sakleavn pudgala), whereas the one who 
is endowed with dharmas belonging to purification (*vyavadnadharma) will be called “a 
pudgala endowed with purification” (*vyavadnavn pudgala). But pollution and purifica-
tion entail many (*bahu[vi]dh) degrees (*avasth): those abiding in little, moderate or 
great pollution will be called “pudgalas of little, moderate or great desire (*rga),” while 
those abiding in little, moderate or great purification will be called “pudgalas having 
obtained a little, moderate or great path (*-mrgaprpta).” Those who engage in bad actions 
only (*ekntkualakarmakrin) will be called “inclined towards (*sakleapakapatita), 
siding with pollution,” whereas those who engage in good actions only (*ekntakuala-
karmakrin) will be called “inclined towards (*vyavadnapakapatita), siding with purifica-
tion” (see also Vairocanarakita MS 46b5–6: ya pudgala ekntakualakr sa sa-
kleacchedabheda[ka] / ya caikntavyavadnakarmakr sa vyavadnacchedabhedaka 
/). In the same way, those who are addicted to pollution and to purification will respectively 
be called “pudgalas given up to pollution” and “pudgalas given up to purification.” Or, one 
may say, concerning those who abide in pollution or purification: “This pudgala has a 
polluted mental series,” “This pudgala has a purified mental series.” See also MSAVBh tsi 
D175b1–5/P206a8–b5. 
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series. In this [connection], in the Parijñstra, the factors that are to be known 
are the impurity, [whereas] the knowledge is the purification.111 In the Bhra-
hrastra, the burden and the taking up of the burden [belong to] impurity, 
[whereas] the laying down of the burden [belongs to] purification.112 In the ab-
111 According to MSAVBh tsi D175b5–176a2/P206b5–207a2, in the Parijñstra (yos su es 
pa’i mdo sde), the factors that are to be known (*parijñeyadharma) and the knowledge 
(*parijñ) are twofold each: the truth of suffering (*dukhasatya) and the truth of origin 
(*samudayasatya) are the factors that are to be known; they side with pollution (kun nas ñon 
mos pa’i phyogs su bsdu = sakleapakasag	hta?). As for the truth of destruction 
(*nirodhasatya) and the truth of the path (*mrgasatya), they are the knowledge itself, and 
side with purification (rnam par bya ba’i phyogs su bsdu = vyavadnapakasag	hta?). In 
the absence of the designation “pudgala,” it would be impossible to indicate the different 
addictions (*v	tti) and (mental) series (*santna) of those who are said to be persons who 
are (still) to be taught the things to be known (?yos su es par bya ba’i ga zag) and 
persons who know thoroughly (yos sur es par byed pa’i ga zag = parijñtvipudgala?). 
Among them, the persons who are (still) to be taught the things to be known, whose mental 
series is endowed with dharmas belonging to pollution, are engaged on the side of pollution 
(kun nas ñon mos pa’i phyogs la 	ugs pa = sakleapakaprav	tta?); as for the person who 
knows thoroughly, whose mental series is endowed with dharmas belonging to purification, 
he is engaged in the dharmas belonging to purification (*vyavadnadharmaprav	tta). On 
parijñtvin, see above, n. 109. For the Pli Pariññsutta, see SN III.26 (= no. XXII.23). 
The stra begins thus: pariññeye ca bhikkhave dhamme desissmi pariññañca /. Here, the 
parijñeyadharmas consist of corporeity (rpa), affective sensation (vedan), ideation (saññ 
= samjñ), conditioned factors (sakhra = saskra), and direct awareness (viñña = 
vijñna), whereas parijñ consists of the destruction of desire (rgakkhaya = rgakaya), 
the destruction of defilements (dosakkhaya = doakaya) and the destruction of error (moha-
kkhaya = mohakaya). 
112 According to MSAVBh tsi D176a2–6/P207a2–7, in the Bhrahrastra (khur khyer ba’i 
mdo sde), the pudgala who bears the burden and the pudgala who lays down the burden are 
twofold each. Here, the truth of suffering (*dukhasatya) is called the burden (*bhra), 
whereas the truth of origin (*samudayasatya) is called either the bearing (*bhrahra) or 
the taking up of the burden (*bhrdna). Both side with pollution. The laying down of the 
burden (*bhranikepa[a]) is also twofold: when (*kad) the burden is laid down 
(*nikipta; at the time of destruction, *nirodhakla), and by means of what (*kena) the 
burden is laid down (by means of the truth of the path, *mrgasatya). Both side with 
purification. Those pudgalas who haven’t yet eliminated (*apraha) suffering and its origin 
are said to be engaged (*prav	tta) in the bearing of the burden and to have a mental series 
endowed with a burden. Those pudgalas who have obtained (*prpta) the truth of 
destruction and the truth of the path are said to be engaged in the laying down of the burden 
and to have a mental series endowed with the laying down of the burden. Note Vairocana-
rakita’s explanation (MS 46b6): bhro dukhasatyam / bhrdna samudayasatyam / 
nikepaa hnir vyavadna nirodhamrgasatyam /. For the Pli Bhrasutta, see SN 
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sence of the designations of pudgalas [such as] the parijñtvin and the 
bhrahra, it would be impossible to point to their different addictions and 
different [mental] series. [As for the thirty-seven] factors that are aids to 
awakening, they possess various degrees according to the different paths [in 
which they are cultivated, viz., those] of preparation, of vision, of cultivation and 
of culmination; [and] in the absence of the designation of pudgalas such as the 
raddhnusrin, it would be impossible to point to their different addictions and 
different [mental] series.113 This is to be known as the reason (naya) why the 
________________________________ 
III.25–26 (= no. XXII.22). For the Chinese versions of the Bhrahrastra (T. 2, no. 99 
[19a15ff] and 125 [631c11ff]), see Okada/Kishi 2008:101–102, and Frauwallner 2010:16 for 
a translation). In the Pli version of the stra, the burden consists of the five constituents-of-
(pseudo-)personality to which one clings (pañcupdnakkhandha =  pañcopdnaskandha); 
the taking up of the burden consists of craving (tah = t	); the laying down of the 
burden consists of cessation (nirodha). As for the laying hold of the burden (bhrahra), “it 
is the person […], that venerable one of such and such a name, of such and such a family” 
(puggalo… yoya yasm evanmo evagotto). On the Bhrahrastra, see also AKBh 
468,1–9/LE88,1–14 (Koa V.256–257), and especially the long quotation in AKVy 706,3–
12: bhra ca vo bhikavo deayiymi bhrdna ca bhranikepaa ca bhrahra 
ca / tac ch	uta sdhu ca su
hu ca manasikuruta bhiye / bhra katama / 
pañcopdnaskandh / bhrdna katamat / t	 paunarbhavik nandrgasahagat 
tatratatrbhinandin / bhranikepaa katamat / yad asy eva t	y paunarbhaviky 
nandgatasahagatys tatratatrbhinandiny aeapraha pratinisargo vyantbhva 
kayo virgo nirodho vyupaamo ’stagama / bhrahra katama / pudgala iti syd 
vacanyam / yo ’sv yumn evanm evajanya evagotra evamhra evasukhadu-
khapratisavedy evadrghyur evacirasthitika evamyumanta iti /. Note also AKBh 
465,15–16/LE70,1–3: sa yumn evanm evajtya evagotra evamhra evasukha-
dukhapratisavedy evadrghyur evacirasthitika evamyuparyanta iti /. The proper 
exegesis of the Bhrastra is also dealt with in TS 349 and TSP K130,1–21/165,1–19 (see 
Schayer 1931–1932:88–91). The TSP contains two quotations. (1) TSP K130,1–3/165,1–4: 
bhra vo bhikavo deayiymi bhrdna bhranikepa bhrahra ca / tatra 
bhra pañcopdnaskandh bhrdna t	ptir (K:  t	) bhranikepo moko bhra-
hra pudgal iti /. (2) TSP K130,15–16/165,12–14: yo ’sv yumann [sic] evanm 
evajtir evagotra evamhra evasukhadukhapratisavedy evadrghyur iti […]. 
According to Bareau 1955:115, the Bhrahrastra belonged to the scriptural texts most 
oft-quoted by the Vtsputryas (see Venkata Ramanan 1953:170–171 and 178–179). 
113 According to MSAVBh tsi D176a7–b6/P207a8–b8, these 37 factors are cultivated by the 
candidate while abiding in the path of preparation (*prayogamrgvasthym), in the path 
of vision (*daranamrgvasthym), in the path of cultivation (*bhvanmrg-
vasthym) and in the path of culmination (*ni
hmrgvasthym). In other words, the 
degrees of their cultivation (*bhvanvasth) are manifold (*bahu[vi]dh). Among these 
paths, the path of preparation refers to the four *adhimukticarybhmis, and the pudgala 
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Blessed One] has taught the pudgala although [it] does not exist as a [real] 
substance.  
Otherwise,114 the [Blessed One’s] teaching of the pudgala [would] indeed be 
pointless. 115First, it cannot have been aimed at generating the [false] view of a 
self [in the living beings], because the view of a self is not to be generated [in the 
living beings] [MSA 18.103a], since it has arisen well before.116 117Nor was it 
aimed at [allowing the living beings to] cultivate this [already existing but not 
yet cultivated view of a self], for of [this] view of a self, [their] cultivation is 
beginningless [MSA 18.103b]. And if it had been taught because [one achieves] 
________________________________ 
who cultivates the 37 factors at that time is called an *adhimukticripudgala. At the time of 
the *daranamrga, the bodhisattvas have obtained the first stage (*bhmi), whereas the 
rvakas have obtained the *srotapattimrga (the srotapanna is the one who has not yet 
abandoned the bhvanheyakleas, AKBh 356,1 and Koa IV.200; for an etymology of 
srotapanna, see AKBh 356,4–5 and Koa IV.200) and the pudgala who cultivates the 37 
factors at that time (*tatkle) is called a *daranamrgasthapudgala. According to the 
method of the Great Vehicle (*mahynanayena), the *bhvanmrga starts at the second 
stage, whereas according to the method of the Lesser Vehicle (*hnaynanayena), it starts at 
the obtention of the *srotapattiphala, and the pudgala who cultivates the 37 factors at that 
time is called a *bhvanmrgasthapudgala. According to the method of the Great Vehicle, 
the *ni
hmrga refers to the *abhisambodhi, whereas according to the method of the 
Lesser Vehicle, it refers to the obtention of the *arhat(tva)phala, and the pudgala who 
cultivates the 37 factors at that time is called *aaikapudgala (on the arhat or aaika, see 
AK 6.45ab, AKBh 365,16–20 and Koa IV.230–231). For an outline of the non-Mahynist 
path, see Koa IV.iv–xi; for an account of the stages in the bodhisattva’s career, see Dayal 
1970:270–291; on the 37 bodhipakya/bodhipkikadharmas, see 2. The Immediate Context 
of MSA(Bh) 18.92–103, 2.1 and n. 34. 
114 I.e., if there were no rationale behind the Buddha’s resorting to this flatus vocis. 
115 According to MSAVBh tsi D176b7–177a1/P208a2–3, the Pudgalavdin now objects that the 
Blessed One has taught the pudgala in order to generate the view of a self (*tmad	
i) in 
the mental series (*cittasantna) of those living beings (*sattva) in whose mental series the 
view of a self has not yet arisen (*anutpanntmad	
icittasantna).  
116 According to MSAVBh tsi D177a3–4/P208a6, the false view of a self (*tmad	
i) is no 
longer to be generated since it has been present in their mental series (*cittasantna) since 
the beginningless time (*andikla) of sasra. 
117 According to MSAVBh tsi D177a4–5/P208a6–7, the Pudgalavdin now objects that, al-
though the view of a self (*tmad	
i) has arisen in the mental series (*cittasantna) of the 
living beings, these do not cultivate (*abhysa) it; the Blessed One has taught the pudgala 
so that these living beings may cultivate the view of a self. 
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liberation through the vision of the self,118 then [it would mean that] all [living 
beings could] achieve liberation without effort [MSA 18.103c], for all those who 
have not [yet] seen the [noble] truths have the [false] view of a self.119 Or, it 
results that there is simply no liberation [MSA 18.103d1]. For no one, having 
first120 grasped the self as non-self, [would] grasp [it] as the self when fully com-
prehending the truth121 in the same way as [someone] who, having first failed to 
grasp suffering as suffering, [will] grasp [it as suffering] afterwards.122 Thus, 
[since] after [the full comprehension of truth the non-grasping of the self as the 
self would be exactly the same] as before, there would be no liberation [at all]. 
And if the tman [really] exists, [then,] due to the notion of “I” and the notion of 
“mine,” craving for the [pleasure of the] self and [all] the other defilements 
caused by this [very view of a self] will necessarily arise. For this reason also, 
118 According to MSAVBh tsi D177a6/P208b1–2, although the living beings (*sattva) cultivate 
the view of a self (*tmad	
i) and are only familiar with the self through its name 
(*nmamtra), they cannot reach liberation (*moka; *apavarga; *nirva) because they 
don’t really see the self, which has the size of a thumb (*agu
hamtra) or the size of a 
mustard-seed (*sarapamtra). The Blessed One has taught the pudgala so that the living 
beings, by seeing this tiny self, may achieve liberation. Sthiramati alludes here to Upania-
dic speculations about the size of the tman: agu
hamtra in Katha Upaniad 4.12; 
sarapa in 
vetvatara Upaniad 3.14.3. For a similar discussion in the context of the 
polemic against the Pudgalavdin, see Traité II.744 and n. 1; on sarapa, see also Venkata 
Ramanan 1953:189. 
119 According to MSAVBh tsi D177b2–4/P208b5–7, if one achieves liberation through the view 
of a self (*tmad	
i), then, since ordinary persons (*p	thagjana) who per definitionem have 
not seen the truths (i.e., have not yet reached the path of vision) are possessed with the view 
of a self, all living beings (*sattva) would achieve liberation (*moka; *nirva) without 
making any effort towards listening (ruta, i.e., the rutamay prajñ), reflection (cint, i.e., 
the cintmay prajñ) and cultivation (bhvan, i.e., the bhvanmay prajñ). 
120 I.e., still as an ordinary person, before the full comprehension of truth (satybhisamaya). 
121 According to MSAVBh tsi D177b5–7/P209a1–3, in the religious doctrine (dharma) accord-
ing to which the self exists (bdag yod pa'i chos), one does not see the self before engaging in 
the cultivation (*bhvan) process, but rather sees selflessness(/sees that the self does not 
exist: bdag med par mtho ba) and does not, therefore, achieve liberation (*moka). But 
once cultivation has taken place, one sees that the self exists and hence achieves liberation. 
122 According to MSAVBh tsi D177b5–7/P209a1–3, since one does not see the four truths of 
suffering, etc. (*dukhdisatyacatu
aya) before engaging in listening (ruta, i.e., the ruta-
may prajñ), reflection (cint, i.e, the cintmay prajñ) and cultivation (bhvan, i.e., the 
bhvanmay prajñ), one does not achieve liberation (*moka), but after these have taken 
place, one sees the four truths and achieves liberation. 
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there would be no liberation [at all].123 One should rather not (na v) accept that 
the pudgala [MSA 18.103d2] [really] exists, for if it exists, [all] the [afore-
mentioned] evils [will] necessarily follow. 
5. Text-critical remarks 
L155,25 reads: nopalabdh, against MS A 154b3 (nopalabdho) and MS B 141a5 
(nopalabdho). Read: nopalabdho (see already Lévi 1911:261n. 1). 
L155,29 reads: na ca viparysa, against MS A 154b3 (na cviparysa), MS B 
141b1 (na cviparysa), MSABhtib P262b1–2 (phyin ci ma log pa […] ma yin 
no) and MSAVBh tsi D164b6–7/P193b4 (phyin ci ma log pa […] mi […]). 
Read: na cviparysa (to be compared with Lévi 1911:261n. 2). 
L155,30 reads: na caia saklea iti, against MS A 154b6 (sa caia saklea 
iti), MS B 141b1 (sa caia saklea iti), MSABhtib P261b2 (de kun nas ñon 
mos pa yin no 	es bya bar) and MSAVBh tsi D165a1/P193b7 (de kun nas ñon 
mos pa yin par). Read: sa caia saklea iti (see already Lévi 1911:261n. 3). 
L156,3 reads: ekatvnyatvato vcyas, against L154,30 (ekatvnyatvato ’vcyas), 
MS B 141b3 (ekatvnyatvato ’vcyas), MSABhtib P261b3–4 (gcig da g	an du 
brjod bya min), MSAVBh tsi D165b2/P194b1 (gcig da tha dad mi brjod de); 
the reading of MS A 155a2 (ekatvnyatvato vcyas) is of course no argument in 
favour of ekatvnyatvato vcyas. Read: ekatvnyatvato ’vcyas (see already 
Lévi 1911:259n. 93.1.a). 
L157,3, MS A 156a3, MS B 142a7 and MSAVBh tsi D169a5/P199a2 (gñis la 
brten nas) read: dvaya prattya, against L155,3 (dvaye sati ca) and MSABhtib 
P268a7–8 (gñis yod [*dvaye sati ca]). I have read: dvaya prattya. 
123 To be compared with AKBh 472,7–11/LE118,3–7: yadi ctm bhavet tathgat eva suvyak-
ta payeyu / payat ctmagrho d	hatara syt / tmani ca saty tmya bhavatti 
stre vacand* tmyagrho ‘py e skandhev adhika pravarteta / sai syt sat-
kyad	
i / tmyad	
au ca satym tmyasneha / evam e d	hatartmtmyasne-
haparighitabandhann moko dratarbhavet /. *LE118n. 534 refers to S (462b27), T 
1, 765b28, MN I.138, sutta no. 22. 
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L157,5 (but also MS A 153a5 and MS B 140b4, which correspond to L155,5!) 
reads: svāmitve sati vā-, against L155,5 (but also MS A 156a4 and MS B 142b1, 
which correspond to L157,5!), which reads: svāmitve sati cā-. In other words, 
L155,5 reads cā- against the manuscripts (vā-), and L157,5 reads vā- against the 
manuscripts (cā-). Neither MSABhtib P260b7 = P262a8 (bdag po ñid cig yin na 
ni // mi rtag mi ’dod ’byuṅ mi byed) nor the pratīka in MSAVBh tsi D169b1–
2/P199a6 (bdag po yin na mi rtag daṅ // mi ’dod pa ni ’byuṅ mi byed) does not 
allow a decision. I have read: svāmitve sati vā-.
L157,6 reads: svāmībhavann aniṣṭaṃ vijñānam, against MS A 156a5 (svāmī
bhavan [sic] iṣṭavijñānam [sic]), MS B 142b1 (svāmī bhavan [sic] iṣṭaṃ
vijñānam), MSABhtib P262a8–b1 (bdag po ñid gcig yin na ni rnam par śes 
pa ’dod pa). Read: svāmī bhavann iṣṭaṃ vijñānam (see already Lévi 1911:262n. 
4a).
On L157,10–11 (yadi dravyato […] rūpaprasādādi), see above, n. 89.
L157,15, MS A 156b3 and MS B 142b6 read: tīrthyā°, against MSABhtib
P262b5 (gźan mu stegs can [*anyatīrthyā°] (no pratīka in MSAVBh)). Read: 
tīrthyā°.
L157,17, MS A 156b5, MS B 142b7 and MSAVBh tsi D171a2/P201a4 (lta ba la 
sogs pa) read: darśanādiṣu, against MSABhtib P262b6–7 (de lta ba la sogs pa la 
[*sa darśanādiṣu]). Read: darśanādiṣu.
L157,18–19, MS A 156,5–6 and MS B 142b7–143a1 read: svayambhūr vā 
bhaved ākasmikaḥ (ākasmika MSS A and B) / tatpratyayo […], against 
MSABhtib P262b7 (see also MSAVBh tsi D171a5/P201a7–8), which reads: raṅ
byuṅ ba glo bur ba’am / de’i rkyen las […], i.e., *svayambhūr vā bhaved 
ākasmikas tatpratyayo vā /. I have read: svayambhūr vā bhaved ākasmikas 
tatpratyayo vā / (see already Lévi 1911:263n. 5).
L158,13, MS A 157b1, MS B 143b1 and MSAVBh tsi D171a2/P201a4 (de’i
rkyen las byuṅ ba yin na ni) read: sati hi tatpratyayatve, against MSABhtib
P263a5–6 (de de’i rkyen ñid yin na ni [*sati hi tasmin tatpratyayatve]). Read: 
sati hi tatpratyayatve.
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L158,21, MS A 157b7, MS B 143b5 and MSAVBh tsi D173b7/P204b2 (rnam 
par smin pa) read: vipka, against MSABhtib P263b1 (las kyi rnam par smin pa 
[*karmavipka]). Read: vipka. 
L158,23 and MS B 143b6 read: iti deit, which makes no sense in the absence 
of a feminine subject. MS A 157b9 reads iti dejit [sic], which might be 
construed with pañcdnav (tmopalambha [iti] being, then, in the nominative 
[“five evils have been taught to be/as the perception of a self”]). MSABhtib 
P263b2, however, clearly interprets tmopalambha as a locative (bdag tu dmigs 
pa la ñes dmigs la ste […] 	es bad de /). Moreover, and in the same context, 
L158,20 and L158,22 read: iti deitam. I have read: iti deitam. 
L159,3, MS A 158a4 and MS B 144a2 read: saklee vyavadne ca, against 
L155,15, MS A 154a3 and MS B 140b7 (and L159,5, MS A 158a5 and MS B 
144a3), which read: sakleavyavadne ca. saklee vyavadne ca can only be 
in the locative case, while sakleavyavadne ca can also be, as a dual, in the 
nominative case (this might have been Sthiramati’s understanding, who puts the 
six terms involved on the same level in MSAVBh tsi D174b6–7/P205b4–5 (kun 
nas ñon mos pa tha dad pa da / rnam par bya ba tha dad pa da / gnas pa 
tha dad pa da / chad pa tha dad pa da / ’jug pa tha dad pa da / rgyud tha 
dad pa dag bstan du mi ru gi […]). I am inclined to read both as locatives (for 
the singular dvandva, see Renou 1996:104, §86B and BHSG §23.2–3), as 
MSABhtib P263b5–6 and MSABhtib P263b6 (both with genitive particles: “of 
pollution and purification” in the sense “in(/concerning) pollution and purifi-
cation”) also seem to reflect. (The pratkas in MSAVBh tsi D174b5–6/P205b3–4 
and MSAVBh tsi D175b1–2/P206a8–b1 are of little use.) In the reading: 
saklee vyavadne ca, the particule ca needs not be interpreted as connecting 
MSA 18.102 to MSA 18.101, a function that seems to be that of hi. Although the 
singular dvandva is represented twice (L155,15 and L159,5), I have read: 
saklee vyavadne ca. 
L159,11–12, MS A 158b2, MS B 144a7 read: yensati dravyato ’stitve, against 
MSABhtib P264a3 (ci’i phyir [kena?] instead of yena) and MSAVBh tsi 
D176b6/P207b8 (de’i phyir [tena?] instead of yena). Read: yensati dra-
vyato ’stitve. 
L159,15 reads: antpdy. Read: anutpdy. 
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L159,20 reads: sarve na d	
asatynm, against MS A 158a6–7 (sarvem 
[sic] ad	
asatynm), MS B 144b3 (sarvem ad	
asatynm) and MSABhtib 
P264a5 (bden pa ma mtho ba thams cad). Read: sarvem ad	
asatynm. 
L160,2 reads: yathprva. Read: yath prva. 
Daas 
L155,27: viparyst tath. Read: viparyst / tath 
L156,17: ekatvennyatvena ca agnir. Read: ekatvennyatvena ca / agnir 
L156,21: upalabdhes tath. Read: upalabdhe / tath 
L156,22: tatrendhanam iti ata. Read: tatrendhanam iti / ata 
L156,23: dvayena hi upalabdher. Read: dvayena hi / upalabdher 
L157,7: ani
a ca / naiva. Read: ani
a ca naiva / 
L157,18–19: kasmika / tatpratyayo. Read: kasmikas tatpratyayo (v) 
L158,6: vijñt sati. Read: vijñt / sati 
L158,20: deita paramrtha°. Read: deitam / paramrtha° 
L158,22: pratisadadhti / anyatra. Read: pratisadadhty anyatra 
L158,23: jvad	
i nirvieo. Read: jvad	
i / nirvieo 
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